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BEFORE THE UNITED STATES ANTHRACITE 
COAL COMMISSION 



Oummary, Analysis and statement 



Presented by 

W. JETT LAUCK 






On behalf of 

John L. Lewis, President 

Philip Murray, Vice-President 

F. P. Hanaway, International Representative 

Percy Tetlow, Statistician 

ThomS e Ke'nLdyl 00 ^^ 6 Renting 
Chris. J. Golden J District. 1 . 7 and 9 

Of the 

United Mine Workers of America 



WASHINGTON 
1920 



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CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

The Increase in the Cost of Living, 1914-1920 3 

The Relationship between Rates of Pay in the Anthracite Mines and Earnings 

and the Cost 'of Living 3 

Probability of Higher Instead of Lower Prices 4 

The Old Theory of Wages b 

Anthracite Mine-Workers have not Received and are not at Present Receiving a 

Living Wage 6 

The Sanction for the Living Wage 8 

Definition of a Living Wage 15 

The Practicability of the Living Wage 16 

The Cost of the Minimum of Subsistence 17 

A Minimum Standard of Health and Reasonable Comfort 17 

Earnings Necessary to Maintain an American Standard of Living 17 

The Conservatism of the Anthracite Workers' Demands 18 

Bases of Wage Adjustment 19 

The Hazards of Anthracite Mining 21 

The Sanction of Union Recognition 21 

Irregularity of Employment in the Anthracite Coal Industry 28 

Earnings of Anthracite Workers 29 

Comparison of Earnings and Wage Rates in the Anthracite and Bituminous 

Mines of Pennsylvania 30 

Standardization of Rates of Pay 31 

The Relations between Wages and Production, Costs, Prices, and Profits in the 

Anthracite Mining Industry „ 32 

Labor and the General Increase in the Cost of Living 36 

Wages and Wholesale and Retail Prices 36 

Significance of Combination in the Anthracite Industry 37 

Earnings of Anthracite Railroads 40 

Financial Management of Anthracite Railroads 40 

Profits of Anthracite Operators 43 

Freight Rates on Anthracite Coal, 1914-1920 44 



o; or s. 

AUG 24 J920 



THE INCREASE IN THE COST OF LIVING, 1914-1920. 

The extraordinary increase in the cost of living which began with the European 
war has continued almost without interruption up to the present time (May, 1920). 
The most recent authoritative information indicates that the increase from 1914 
to May, 1920, for the country as a whole, has been approximately 104 per cent. 
For the industrial centers where war activities led to the greatest labor influx and 
consequent congestion of population, the increase may be estimated at approxi- 
mately 111 per cent. 

For the distinctly anthracite mining towns no special cost of living data are 
available, as, with one exception, they have not been covered by any of the recent 
cost of living investigations. The exception is Scranton, Pennsylvania, which was 
included in an investigation made by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1919. This 
particular investigation covered only a period of a year and a half — from December, 
1917, to June, 1919. During that year and a half the increase in the cost of living 
in Scranton was found to be exactly the same — 25 per cent — as the average increase 
in the large ship-building centers where industry had been most stimulated and 
prices are known to have advanced most rapidly. 

This fact would suggest that the anthracite section of Pennsylvania suffered the 
same extreme increase in living costs — namely, 111 per cent — as did the seaboard 
shipbuilding centers. (See Bulletin No. 6, Bureau of Applied Economics, Employes' 
Exhibit No. — .) 



THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RATES OF PAY IN THE ANTHRACITE 
MINES AND EARNINGS AND THE COST OF LIVING. 

The most important occupation in the anthracite mines is that of contract miner. 
These men form about 30 per cent of all the employees of the industry, and with 
their laborers form about half. The contract rates are so numerous and varied that 
no attempt has ever been made to standardize them, and all wage adjustments have 
accepted them as they stood and added thereto a specified percentage increase. The 
total increase since 1912 in these rates amounts to 49.8 per cent. 

The cost of living since 1914 (at which time the contract rates were the same as 
in 1912) has risen 104 per cent up to May 1st, 1920. It is evident that the contract 
miners are not today as well off as they were at the beginning of the war in 1914. 
That is to say, their earnings today from every car of coal mined are able to pur- 
chase a very much smaller amount of commodities than they could buy in 1914. 

In order to raise the present contract rates up to the same purchasing power 
they possessed in 1914, it would be necessary to increase them by 36.2 per cent. 
That is, the rate that was $1.00 per car in 1912 and is $1,498 today should be 
increased by 36.2 per cent or up to $2.04 per car in order to meet the increase that 
has taken place in the cost of living. But simply raising the rates up to the cost 
of living does not result in even approximate justice to the worker on account of 
the great lapse of time in which he has been forced to accept rates that had largely 
depreciated in purchasing power since their establishment. In other words, in so 
far as purchasing power is concerned, the miner has not been receiving the wage 
that was agreed upon. The rate as originally set was sufficient to purchase a given 
number of pounds of flour for every car of coal mined. The miner understood that 
the month's supply of food and clothing for himself and his family could be 
obtained by mining a given number of cars of coal. But very soon after the rate 
was set, the cost of all commodities advanced while the rate remained constant, 
and the miner found that in order to make his earnings cover his expenses he would 
have to go without many things he had become accustomed to regard as necessi- 
ties, or else he would run into debt. 

If the present rates were increased by .36.2 per cent, they would be restored to the 
same purchasing power that they had in 1914, but there would be nothing left with 
which to pay the debts incurred during the period when the rates lagged behind the 



cost of living, and the miner would not be recompensed for the losses that he has 
undergone from this same cause. To compensate him for these losses present rates 
would have to be increased 60.3 per cent. 

As a matter of fact, the requests of the anthracite mine workers, as placed before 
the Commission, in comparison with advances in living costs, already show losses 
in addition to those to which reference has already been made. Our requests are 
based on the award of the Bituminous Coal Commission of March, 1920. Since this 
award was made, cost of living for anthracite mine workers has advanced from 97 
to 104 per cent as compared with the period immediately preceding the war. Liv- 
ing costs, in other words, have increased between 3 and 4 per cent since the pres- 
ent bituminous coal rates of pay were established and the most authoritative 
sources of information show that the price peak has not as yet been reached. As 
a consequence, our wage requests on the basis of the increased cost of living are 
most conservative, and, if we are placed on a parity in wage rates with the workers 
in bituminous mines, as we trust we shall be, our real wages will have already 
undergone a reduction of almost 4 per cent as contrasted with the cost of living of 
the period on which they are based. 



PROBABILITY OF HIGHER INSTEAD OF LOWER PRICES. 

All authoritative statements point to the fact that no early decline in retail 
prices can be expected. Commissioner Meeker, of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
probably the closest student of the subject, in a recent article, said (Monthly Review, 
February, 1920, Exhibit Number — ) : 

" Everybody is anxiously watching the course of prices and even more 
anxiously inquiring when, if ever, prices are coming down. The wish is father 
to the thought, and it is easy for the housewife to accept any statement that 
prices are slated for a fall in the near future. 

" Before attempting to answer the query as to when, if ever, prices are to 
fall, it would be well to consider the causes which have brought about the 
remarkable rise in prices since 1915. These causes may be summarized as 
follows : 

" 1. By far the most important cause of increased prices is the enormous 
additions to the circulating medium, money and its substitutes, during the 
past four years; 

" 2. Decrease in the actual physical qualities of goods produced and ex- 
changed ; 

" 3. Manufacture for and purchase by the governments of the world for war 
and other purposes; and 

" 4. Changes in the demands for and the supply of goods and services. 

" If prices are to be lowered, the causes operating to boost prices must be 
attacked. The amount of money and checks in circulation must be appreciably 
reduced and the quantities of necessary goods must be increased in amount. 
The stocks of commodities manufactured on government account must, so far 
as possible, be salvaged and thrown upon the market. The extraordinary 
demands for goods new and old must either be curtailed or production of these 
goods expanded to meet the needs. 

" The financing of the war has made two dollars grow where but one dollar 
grew before. This, coupled with the fact that there has been an enormous 
destruction of economic goods and of the farms, mines, forests, and factories 
supplying these goods, explains the enormous and world-wide decrease in the 
purchasing power (value) of money, which caused increased prices. As long 
as the people have twice as many dollars with which to buy a small number 
of commodities, prices are bound to remain high. It will take a long time to 
deflate the world's inflated currencies or to inflate the world's deflated supply 
of goods. 

" I see no prospect of any considerable fall in prices for several years to come. 
It will be impossible for the governments of the world to pay off their debts 
very rapidly. On the contrary, there is every reason to apprehend that credits 
must be issued to foreign governments, foreign manufacturers, and foreign 
business men, in order to rehabilitate the broken and shattered industries of 
Europe. This being the case, we may expect that larger volumes of checks 
and credit instruments will be thrown in circulation, thus boosting prices still 
higher. If it is impossible to reduce the volume of the world's indebtedness 
suddenly, it is even more impossible to increase the quantity of the world's 



goods suddenly. Of course, the world's productive forces are being marshalled 
as rapidly as possible in order to increase the production from farms, forest, 
nrnes and factories, but this necessarily is a slow process, especially in these 
times of great business instability and labor unrest. The 1919 farm crops have 
practicallv all been marketed. The only way that prices can be brought down 
before next year's crops begin to find their way to market is through deflation 
of the currency. As pointed out above, still further inflations are inevitable if 
Europe is to rehabilitate her industries so that she can increase her supply of 
material goods and thus bring about lower prices by increasing goods and 
decreasing debts. 

" Some business men are apprehensive that the United States will be flooded 
with European-made goods which will bring prices tumbling down. The prices 
of foreign exchange at the present moment are such as to make it highly profit- 
able for American business men to buy large quantities of goods in Europe, 
especially in Germany and Austria, if European countries only had the goods to 
sell. Not until Europe has rehabilitated its industries may we expect to have 
our markets flooded with European goods. That puts off the tumble in prices 
several years." 

Increased Cost of Living Shotjij) Be Discarded as a Method of Wage Adjustment. 

It should be obvious that the mere addition of the increased cost of living to 
inadequate rates of pay would be wholly unacceptable, whether considered from 
the point of view of the men themselves or from the point of view of citizens 
interested in the welfare of the nation as a whole. This principle, that wages 
should merely keep pace with the cost of living, was nothing more than a war- 
time measure. Under it both sides agreed not to profit out of the national emer- 
gency. Organized labor kept patriotically to this principle — to what extent is well 
known. In sorry contrast, the worker is just beginning to see the extent to which 
the corporations of the country did actually profiteer upon the emergency of the 
nation. 

But now that the war is over, this principle, which is fundamentally unjust, must 
lapse and a new principle, in lire with the most enlightened thought of the day, 
must be adopted as the true basis for wage-adjustments. 



THE OLD THEORY OF WAGES. 

The old theory or " law of wages," was that wages were determined by the inter- 
play of the forces of supply and demand. Labor, in other words, was viewed as a 
commodity whose value was determined in the same way as wheat, coal, and iron 
and steel, textiles and other commodities. Little, if any, consideration was given 
by the economists of past years to the human or ethical elements in the wage 
problem. Their point of view was that the supply of labor as a productive factor 
increased in geometrical ratio. Through the placing of this supply at any time 
over against the demand fcr labor, the rate of pay to labor was determined. In the 
event of any dislocation to or collapse in industry, labor was the residual sufferer. 
The evils arising from unrestrained competition, the cutting of prices, decreased 
industrial demand and industrial depression or collapse, were by the alleged im- 
mutable laws of economics imposed upon the wage-earner. It is no cause for 
wonderment that industrial workers came under these conditions to look upon 
economics as the dismal science of despair. Under its principles they were without 
hope. Their only opportunities for advancing their well-being lay in produc- 
ing goods faster than the labor supply increased, in reducing the birth rate, or in 
the advent of some fortuitous pestilence, plague, or earthquake, or war, which 
would decimate the labor supply and thus give labor a greater bargaining power 
in dealing with employers. 

In the anthracite coal industry the workers not only have had to suffer the 
results of lack of markets but also to contend against an over-supply of labor brought 
about by unrestricted immigration. 



The Present Theory of Wages. 

During recent years, however, and especially during the war period, as our 
exhibits show, there has been a complete change in economic thinking and in the 
principles which have been put forward as the J jnomic justification for wage- 
determinations. The enlightened opinion of mai^und refused to continue to give 
its sanction to such a hopeless theory of wage-fixing as prevailed in past years. 
More consideration came to be extended to labor as a human and moral being. 
Gradually the conception was evolved that human welfare was superior to con- 
siderations of relentless, economic selfishness. Industry came to be considered as 
existing for men and not men for industry. Industry, it was concluded, should be 
the servant and not the master of humanity. The verdict was accepted that any 
industry which could not operate under these humane and ethical limitations was 
anti-social. Labor was no longer to be considered as a raw material of industry or 
to be used and have its price determined as raw material. 

The practical application of this new principle in preventing the free and relentless 
play of the forces of supply and demand in fixing wages consists, as we have shown, 
in the acceptance of the more definite principle that every wage-earner is entitled to 
a living wage. By a living wage is meant not merely a subsistence rate of pay, but 
a wage sufficient after meeting the minimum physical needs of food, clothing and 
shelter, to yield a balance sufficient for a small degree of comfort and to enable the 
wage-earner to secure some reasonable measure of health, recreation, and education. 

The maintenance of such a wage level is defended not only on grounds of human 
and social well-being, but also on the purely selfish consideration that it yields maxi- 
mum industrial efficiency and output. In other words, the more intelligent employer 
of labor has conceded that such a wage standard is the most economical and yields 
the best results from the standpoint of profits. 

ANTHRACITE MINE-WORKERS HAVE NOT RECEIVED AND ARE NOT AT 
PRESENT RECEIVING A LIVING WAGE. ^ 

Our evidence shows that anthracite mine-workers did not receive before the war, 
neither did they during the period of actual hostilities, and they are not now during 
this technical war-time period, receiving a living wage, nor are they able on the 
basis of their present rates of compensation to earn a living wage. This statement 
is at once apparent from the following facts. 

1. Prior to the war the rates of pay of mine-workers were not sufficient to maintain 
a standard of living based on health and reasonable comfort. 

2. The cost of living during the war has increased faster than the advances made in 
rates of pay to anthracite mine-workers, and 

3. The present rates of pay of the mine-workers are, therefore, even more inade- 
quate than they were prior to the war, and are even more insufficient to maintain 
their families on a subsistence level, not to mention a reasonable degree of health 
and comfort. 

Pke-War Standards of Earnings Inadequate. 

According to the most authoritative students, annual earnings of $900 by the 
head of an average household were barely sufficient prior to the war for a minimum 
of physical subsistence. The best pre-war investigation of this kind was made for 
the Russell Sage Foundation by Dr. Robert Cort Chapin. The results of his work 
were published in 1909 under the title " The Standard of Living Among Working- 
men's Families in New York City." His general conclusion (p. 123) from an exhaus- 
tive inquiry into the income and expenditures of typical families, was that it requires 
$900 or over to permit the maintenance of a normal standard, at least as far as the 
physical man is concerned. 

Chapin's study furnished data, which are extremely interesting, regarding the 
proportion of underfed in the different income groups. An analysis of the nutrition 
values of the food of these families showed that the proportion of underfed families 
was as follows: (Chapin, p. 127.) 

Per cent of , 

Family Income. underfed families. 

$400-$599 76 

600- 799 32 

800- 899 22 

900-1000 9 

1100 and over 

6 



" This means," comments Professor Chapin, " that with less than $600 to spend 
for all purposes, an adequate food supply is not provided, and that on from $600 to 
$800 incomes, one family in three is underfed, while less than one in ten of the 
families having $900 to $1000 to spend fell short of the minimum of food." 

From these statements ti )fficial and authoritative sources, it is apparent 

that the annual earnings of ant. acite mine-workers, which were below $900 prior 
to the war (Exhibit Number — ) were barely sufficient, if they really were sufficient, 
to maintain a minimum of physical existence. There was no surplus available for 
recreation, education, the maintenance of health or comfort, or provision for old age. 

It should also be recalled that most of these studies as to the minimum standards 
of family life were made during the period 1907-1910. After these conclusions were 
announced, there was a steady rise in the cost of living which placed the earnings of 
employees in 1914 even on a comparatively lower basis than is indicated by these 
comparisons with minimum standards of subsistence. 

The conclusion is irresistible that the average rates of pay and earnings of 
anthracite workers prior to the war were inadequate, on a bare subsistence level, 
and were not sufficient to support an average family in health and with any degree 
of comfort. The truth of this statement is at once apparent when Dr. Chapin's 
statement is recalled to the effect that even as far back as 1907, families with incomes 
ranging from $800 to $900 were able to maintain a normal standard of living only so 
far as the physical needs of food and fuel were concerned. Also that of the families 
studied by him in these income groups, 22 per cent, or more than one out of every 
five, were underfed. This, in general, we regret to say, was the unattractive economic 
picture of the condition of the anthracite workers, members of our organization, 
prior to the war. It is underestimated rather than overstated, as a matter of fact, 
for no allowance has been made for the increased cost of living which occurred 
during the eight years, 1907-1914. 

The Inadequacy of Increased Rates of Compensation Granted During the War. 

The inadequate wages which prevailed in the anthracite mining districts before 
the war were not even maintained during the war or in other words the cost 
of living has increased faster than advances in rates of pay to the mine-workers. 

The most important occupation in the anthracite mines is that of contract miner. 
These men form about 30 per cent of all the employees of the industry, and with their 
laborers form about half. The contract rates are so numerous and varied that no 
attempt has ever been made to standardize them, and all wage adjustments have 
accepted them as they stood and added thereto a specified percentage increase. The 
total increase since 1912 in these rates amounts to 49.8 per cent. 

The cost of living since 1914 (at which time the contract rates were the same 
as in 1912) has risen 104 per cent up to May 1, 1920, so it is evident that the contract 
miners are not to-day as well off as they were at the beginning of the war in 1914. 
That is to say, their earnings to-day from every car of coal mined are able to 
purchase a very much smaller amount of commodities than they could buy in 1914. 

In order to raise the present contract rates up to the same purchasing power they 
possessed in 1914, it would be necessary to increase them by 36 per cent. 

If the present rates were increased by 36 per cent, they would be restored to the 
same purchasing power they had in 1914, but there would be nothing left with which 
to pay the losses incurred during the period when the rates lagged behind the cost 
of living, and the miner would not be recompensed for the losses that he has under- 
gone from this same cause. To make good these losses would require an increase in 
existing rates of pay of more than 50 per cent. 

Present Rates of Pay are Even More Inadequate Than Pre-War Rates. 

If earnings were inadequate before the war, they were obviously even more 
inadequate during the war, and are now less on the basis of a fixed comparison than 
they should be to maintain the entirely unacceptable standards of living which 
prevailed in the mining regions in the years 1912-1914. Under these conditions, 
the need for a living wage is also clearly apparent. If the earnings of the mine- 
workers before the war were below a bare subsistence level, adding the increased 
cost of living since the war would only restore the inadequate pre-war standards. 
What the mine-worker needs is, we claim, that irrespective of increases in living 
costs, the rates of pay of the mine-worker should be so increased that he be 
assured a living wage. 

7 



THE SANCTION FOR THE LIVING WAGE. 

Theoretically, it can be proven that competition is the ideal method for the distribu- 
tion of wealth, including that form of distribution which we call wages. Such an 
academic demonstration of the benefits of perfect competition Francis A. Walker 
gives in his Political Economy. But academic demonstrations, though proof against 
the assaults of logic, are not proof against the assaults of life itself. And life itself 
has wrecked the theory of competition as it bids fair to wreck the industrial societies 
which attempt to operate under that theory. Francis A. Walker, however, was too 
great an econcmist to be blinded by the academic beauty of the theory of competition 
which he so ably explained, and he demolished in a few sentences all hope that a 
competitive society can hope to exist. On page 378 of his Political Economy he says: 
" For, be it remarked, perfect competition, which affords the only absolute 
security possible for equitable and beneficial distribution, requires that each 
and every man for himself shall unremittingly seek and unfailingly find his best 
market. If for any reason, whether from physical obstruction or legal inhibi- 
tion, or from his own poverty or weakness of will or ignorance, or through 
distrust of his fellows or a habit of submission to his employer or his social 
superiors, any man fails, in fact, to reject the lower price and to seize the higher 
price, the rule of competition is violated; all immunity from deep and permanent 
economic injury is lost; the man may be crushed in his spirit, in his health, in 
his habits of life and may thus sink finally and hopelessly to a lower industrial 
grade. The history of mankind is full of examples of large populations broken 
down by a competition to which they were unequal, until they have become 
pauperized, brutalized and diseased beyond the power of any purely economic 
causes to raise them upwards and restore them to industrial manhood." 
Can there be any doubt that "the rule of competition is violated"; that "all 
immunity from deep and permanent economic injury is lost "; that men are crushed 
in spirit, in health, in habits of life, and that they do sink finally and hopelessly to 
lower industrial grades? Competitive fixing of wages under the so-called law of 
supply and demand can act in no other way than to bring about a progressive 
deterioration of the worker. Since Francis A. Walker wrote the quoted paragraph 
the evidence against the competitive system has piled up on every hand. Some of 
this evidence I offer for your consideration in the form of Employees' Exhibit No. — . 
I wish to call your attention especially to some of the more important points of this 
exhibit. 

Our pride in the splendid troops that defended us in the world war becomes 
touched with shame when we examine the report of the Provost Marshal General 
and realize that while we have produced millions of sturdy young men we have at the 
same time, by our neglect of economic conditions, produced hundreds of thousands 
unable to pass even simple physical tests. The Provost Marshal General reported 
(page 1) that out of 3,208,44G of the draft registrants examined 339,377 or 10.58 per 
cent were physically unfit for general military service, though suitable for special 
or limited service. He further reported the appalling fact that: 

" The registrants who possessed physical defects of such degree as to prevent 
them from rendering military service of any kind numbered 521,606 individuals, 
and constituted 16.25 per cent of the whole number examined." 
And these rejections were even after the lowering of the requirements. The 
standard of the United States Army as to the minimum of height had been up to the 
world war five feet, four inches. The army found it necessary to gradually lower 
this minimum until after April, 1917, it had reached five feet. The requirement as 
to weight was finally reduced to a minimum of one hundred and ten pounds. While 
it cannot be claimed that the condition of all of the individuals rejected was due to 
economic causes other facts warrant the belief that economic conditions were the 
preponderating cause. It has been shown by investigations that the percentage of 
disease and mortality in industrial populations is greater that in non-industrial 
populations. For instance, Bulletin No. 7, of the United State Public Health Service 
says (page 6) : 

" Among the more important economic factors which affect the health of the 
wage-working population may be mentioned the following: 

" The economic disadvantages at which a large proportion of wage-workers 
and their families are placed as the result of low wages and insufficient annual 
income. (P. 8.) 

" The findings of a committee of the American Iron and Steel Institute which 

visited a number of industrial towns are of special significance in this connection. 

" These conditions are similar to those indicated by the mortality statistics of 

the Federal census for many localities where large numbers of low-paid wage- 



workers live. While the death rate for the entire registration area in 1913 
was found to be 14.1 per 1000, in certain communities where investigation has 
shown the prevalence of low wages and unfavorable sanitary conditions the 
rate was much higher. The higher rate in these communities was not attribu- 
table to occupational hazards, since it was above that of other communities 
where similar occupations prevailed. It is only necessary to note, for example, 
that the death rate in 1913 for Fall River, Mass., was 17.2; for Johnstown, Pa., 
16.9; for McKee's Rocks, Pa., 16.9; for Shenandoah, Pa., 18.9, and for Brad- 
dock, Pa., 23.2." 
Support is found given to this by the investigations of infant mortality. The 

Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Labor, giving the results of a 

field study in Johnstown, Pa. (page 7), says: 

. . " The Johnstown report shows a coincidence of underpaid fathers, 
overworked and ignorant mothers and those hazards to the life of the offspring 
which individual parents cannot avoid or control because they must be remedied 
by community action. All this points toward the imperative need of ascertaining 
a standard of life for the American family, a standard which must rest upon such 
betterment of conditions' of work and pay as will permit parents to safeguard 
infants within the household. Toward the slow working out of the essentials 
of such a standard it is hoped that the bureau's continued studies into infant 
mortality may contribute." (Letter of Transmissal — Julia C. Lathrop, Chief. 
Pp. 8-9.) 

" A grouping of babies according to the income of the father shows the 
greatest incidence of infant deaths where wages are lowest, and the smallest 
incidence where they are highest, indicating clearly the relation between low 
wages and ill-health and infant deaths. 

" For all live babies born in wedlock the infant mortality rate is 130.7. It rises 
to 255.7 when the father earns less than $521 a year, or less than $10 a week, and 
falls to 84 when he earns $1200 or more, or if his earnings are ' ample.' The 
variation in the infant mortality rate from one earnings group to another is 
not perfectly regular and consistent, but if any two or more consecutive groups 
are combined, an invariable lowering of the infant mortality rate from one such 
combined group to that next higher results." 
It is to be remembered that the study quoted above was made in 1915 and that the 

wage figures are relative to the cost of living at that time. Another study made at 

the same time and with the same object in view was in Montclair, N. J. (page 8). 

The report of it said: 

" In view of the decision to include in this inquiry all babies born in Montclair 
in 1912, and to study the conditions surrounding them during their first year of 
life, the birth certificates were copied from the records of the health officer for all 
babies born in that year, and a 12-months' lapse of time from the date of birth 
was allowed in each case before the baby was visited; i. e., a baby born in 
November, 1912, was not visited until November, 1913, in order that the first 12 
months of life might have been completed. 

" The infant mortality rate in this study is obtained by comparing the number 
of babies born alive in Montclair in 1912 and included in this study with the 
number of these same babes who died before they were a year old. The 
number of such deaths per 1000 live births gives an exact infant mortality rate 
for the limited group considered. 

" The results of the study in Montclair show that of the 402 babies included in 
the investigation 34 died before they were 1 year old, giving an infant mortality 
rate for this selected group of 1912 babies of 84.6 per 1000 live births." 
But the direct testimony of the observers of our industrial system is unmistakable. 

England justly has the right to be listened to in this respect, and as Memorandum 

No. 7 of the British Health of Munition Workers (page 11) says: 

" Our national experience in industry is longer than that of any other people. 
It has shown clearly enough that false ideas of economic gain, blind to physio- 
logical law, must lead, as they led through the 19th century, to vast national loss 
and suffering. It is clear that unless our industrial life is to be guided in the 
future by the application of physiological science to the details of its manage- 
ment, it cannot hope to maintain its position hereafter among some of its foreign 
rivals, who already in that respect have gained a present advantage." 
Frank A. Vanderlip (page 1) has excellently stated the English situation: 

"A visit to the mill towns of the cotton spinning districts, for example, shows 
almost another race of people compared to the well-fed Englishmen we know 
in London — a race undersized, underfed, underdeveloped and undereducated. 
Lloyd George's famous utterance that you could not build an Al nation out of 

9 



a C3 population has sunk deep into the English mind. The statistics of 
physique which the military annals produce show that one-third of the male 
population of fighting age was unfit for military effort. 

"The other great outstanding fact indicating in British industry a wage scale 
insufficient for what is regarded as a minimum standard of living, is found in 
the great national housing problem. The brutal truth is that England's labor 
has been so underpaid during the last generation that it has been unable to 
keep a roof over its head, and today there is urgent need for homes for a mil- 
lion workingmen's families 

"In order successfully to compete ; n neutral markets, British industry has 
made a red-ink overdraft on the fut .'e, an overdraft on the physique of her 
citizens, an over-draft that has consumed her house facilities; that over-draft 
must now be made good at the expense of the nation." 

And Philip Snowden, Member of Parliament, says (page 5) : 

"Low wages are largely responsible for the material waste, for the physical 
loss and the industrial inefficiency described in this chapter; but the most 
serious of all the loss which is inflicted upon the community by low wages is 
that it destroys the intellects of the very poor and numbs their moral aspira- 
tions. Poverty is an opiate which produces a feeling of contentment with or 
resignation to conditions which ought to excite a righteous discontent. The 
heaviest price which is paid by the community for low wages is the loss of a 
rational ambition for better conditions." 

And Constance Smith, in the Journal of Political Economy (page 5) : 

"Willingly or unwillingly, the wealth acquired by the underpayment of labor 
must needs pay toll toward the maintenance of those of whose incapacity, sick- 
ness, destitution, or crime such underpayment is the fruitful source. Thinking 
people began to realize that, however, splendid the industrial superstructure, 
if its foundations be set in a mass of bad work and half-starved workers, if the 
building be reared above the abyss of inefficiency and misery into which those 
belonging to the higher working grades are in continual danger of slipping, 
carrying with them the children who are necessarily the hope of the next gen- 
eration, the whole building must be in peril. It was perceived that in the case 
of a large class of the community a lowering of both physique and morale was 
going on which must presently amount to a national danger." 

And J. A. Hobson in Work and W T ealth (page 9) : 

" A mass of ill-paid, ill-housed workers, alternately overworked and out of 
work, stands as a chief barrier in every one of those paths of social progress and 
national development which modern statecraft sets itself to follow. The low 
wage of unskilled labor is today a source of infinite waste of the forces of 
national education. Still keeping our argument upon the narrowest lines of 
economy, we plainly realize that the financial resources, upon which the State 
can draw for all her services, depend in the last resort upon the general eco- 
nomic efficiency of the'working population, and that a system of public employ- 
ment which was, however, indirectly, detrimental to this health, longevity and 
intelligence, would rank as bad business from the public standpoint." 

The warning is being just as emphatically stated by American observers. The 
effect of economic conditions on crime, for instance, is stated in the report of the 
Chicago City Council Committee on Crime (page 9): 

"The pressure of economic conditions has an enormous influence in produc- 
ing certain types of crime. Unsanitary housing and working conditions, un- 
employment, wages inadequate to maintain a human standard of living, inevita- 
bly produce the crushed or distorted bodies and minds from which the army of 
crime is recruited. The crime problem is not merely a question of police and 
courts; it leads to the broader problems of public sanitation, education, home 
care, a living wage and industrial democracy." 

Prof. Charles A. Ellwood, of the University of Missouri, asserts that (page 12): 
"The wages of the male worker outside of the home have too often tended 

to conform to the single man's standard Evidently modern industry 

has been quite regardless of the family and has in many instances made it 
very difficult to maintain a proper home life Again, more intense com- 
petition along all lines has forced certain elements of the native white stock 
into occupations where wages are low in comparison with the standard of 
living." ' T ii 

As the final testimony on the breakdown of competitive wage fixing, I call your 
attention to the statement of I. M. Rubinow, President of the American Statistical 
Association (page 12) as follows: 

"In years of falling or even slowly rising prices, the American wage-worker 

10 



was able to hold his own, or to improve his condition to a slight extent. But. 
when confronted with a rapidly-rising price movement, the American wage- 
worker, notwithstanding his strenuous efforts to adjust wages to these new 
price conditions; notwithstanding all his strikes, boycotts and riots; notwith- 
standing all the picturesque I. W. W.-ism, new unionism and the modish sabo- 
tage, has been losing surely and not even slowly, so that the sum total of eco- 
nomic progress in this country for the last quarter of a century appears to be 
a loss of from 10 to 15 per cent in his earning power." 
If chance under the guise of the so-called law of supply and demand is not to be 
allowed to take from us the burden of fixing wages what can be substituted? The 
answer is of course indicated by many of the statements already quoted. Wages 
must be fixed on the basis of those requirements of civilization which will main- 
tain the worker and his family in physical and mental health. Not starvation 
wages for the worker, not even mere subsistence wages will any longer satisfy 
either the intelligence or the conscience of society. Nothing short of a comforta- 
ble living wage will satisfy our conscience or insure the continuance and growth of 
our nation. The exhibit offers voluminous testimony to this state of mind. The 
President's Second Industrial Conference has admirably stated the case (page 17) : 
"Considered from the standpoint of public interest, it is fundamental that the 
basic wages of all employees should be adequate to maintain the employee and 
his family in reasonable comfort, and with adequate opportunity for the edu- 
cation of his children. When the wages of any group fall below this standard 
for any length of time, the situation becomes dangerous to the well-being of 
the State. No country that seeks to protect its citizens from the unnecessary 
ravages of disease, degeneration and dangerous discontent, can consistently let 
the unhampered play of opposing forces result in the suppression of wages 
below a decent subsistence level. Above that point there may well be a fair field 
for the play of competition in determining the compensation for special ability, 
for special strength or special risk (where risk is unavoidable) but below that 
point the matter becomes one of which the State for the sake of its own preser- 
vation must take account." 
But every official organization and agency in the United States that has given 
this matter consideration has pronounced likewise. The United States Commission 
on Industrial Relations in 1914 (page 17) expressed the same opinion. The Bureau 
of Municipal Research of the City of Philadelphia (page 18). The National War 
Labor Board declared the living wage, even for the common laborer, was a right 
(page 21). 
In 1913 Minnesota, in its general laws, provided (page 21) : 

" Sec. 12. Every employer in any occupation is hereby prohibited from em- 
ploying any worker at less than the living wage or minimum wage as defined 
in this act and determined in an order of the Commission, and it shall be unlaw- 
ful for any employer to employ any worker at less than said living or minimum 
wage." 
In the Federal Transportation Act of 1920 it is provided that carriers shall estab- 
lish rates of wages that are just and reasonable, and that in determining the justice 
and reasonableness of such wages the relation between wages and the cost of living 
shall be considered. 

The United States Bituminous Coal Commission in its award in the spring of 1920 
(page 22) said: 

" We have decided to award as a substitute for the 14 per cent increase, 

authorized by Dr. Garfield, a wage increase that is considerably higher. In 

arriving at the present wage award we were guided by the principle that every 

industry must support its workers according to the American standard of living." 

The Supreme Court of Oregon in deciding the question of the constitutionality of 

the Oregon minimum wage law (page 27) declared: 

" Every argument put forth to sustain the maximum hours law or upon which 
it was established applies equally in favor of the constitutionality of the mini- 
mum wage law as also within the police power of the State and as a regulation 
tending to guard the public morals and the public health." 
The official point of view in Great Britain is well illustrated by this paragraph 
• from the report by the Court of Inquiry concerning the transport workers (page 24) : 
" What is a better standard of living? By this is not meant a right to have 
merely a subsistence allowance, in the sense of keeping the soul and body of the 
worker together, but a right to have life ordered upon a higher standard, with 
full regard to those comforts and decencies which are promotive of better 
habits, which give a chance for the development of a greater sense of self- 
respect, and which betoken a higher regard for the place occupied by these 

11 



workers in the scheme of citizenship. The court did not discourage this view; 
on the contrary, it approved it; and it is fair to the Port authorities and em- 
ployer to say that its soundness was not questioned. In the opinion of the court 
the time has gone past for assessing the value of human labor at the poverty 
line." 
Justice Higgins, of the Court of Arbitration, has many time in his decisions put 

the authority of the court back of the living wage. The point of view of the court 

is well shown in these extracts (page 25) : 

" The test of a fair and reasonable standard is a wage sufficient for the normal 
needs of the average employee residing in a civilized community. The essential 
needs are food, shelter and clothing. A full and general allowance for this 
should be made the average man who may be assumed to support an average 
family consisting of himself, his wife and three dependent children. This living 
wage must be kept sacro sanct for all employees." (2 Commonwealth Arbitra- 
tion Reports, p. 3-5.) 

* * * * 

" A growing sense of the value of human life seems to be at the back of all 
these methods of regulating labor; a growing conviction that human life is too 
valuable to be the shuttle-cock in the game of money-making and competition; 
a growing resolve that the injurious strain of the contest, but only so far as it 
is injurious, shall, so far as possible, be shifted from the human instruments." 
(Commonwealth Arbitration Reports, p. 101.) 
And these quotations given on page 26: 

" 1. One cannot conceive of industrial peace unless the employee has secured 
to him wages sufficient for the essentials of human existence. (Boot factories, 
4 Com. Arb. 1, 10 (1910) : Seamen, 5 Com. Arb. 147, 164 (1911).) 

" 2. This, the basic wage, must secure to the employee enough wherewith 
to renew his strength and to maintain his home from day to day. (Broken 
Hill Mine, 3 Com. Arb., 1, 20 (1909).) 

" 3. The basic wage is the same for the employee with no family as for the 

employee with a large family. It rests on Walt Whitman's ' divine average,' 

and the employer need not concern himself with his employee's domestic 

affairs." 

Our public men, our economists, our wide-visioned business men, are more 

emphatic in their statements approving the living wage than courts and official 

organizations can well be. President Wilson, in his Inaugural Address in 1913 

(page 28) stated the moral point of view: 

" The business employer who objects to the payment of a living wage, I leave 
to meditate upon this solemn thought: "He that sheddeth blood and he that 
defraudeth the laborer of his hire are brothers. The bread of the needy is the 
life of the poor; he that defraudeth them thereof is a man of blood." 
Theodore Roosevelt said (page 29): 

" We hold with Lincoln that labor deserves higher consideration than capital. 
Therefore, we hold that labor has a right to the means of life, that there must 
be a living wage." 
In his message to the first session of the 57th Congress (page 29) he also said: 
" With the sole exception of the farming interest, no one matter is of such 
vital moment to our whole people as the welfare of wage-workers. If the 
farmer and the wage-worker are well off, it is absolutely certain that all others 
will be well off, too." 
Former Secretary of Commerce, William C. Redfield (page 30) gave it as his 
opinion that: 

" The industrial manager of today must take a different attitude toward the 
law of the greatest output and the greatest wage. His day when the largest 
output was asked for the smallest wage is passing, not to return, for that theory 
of production is being proved false and expensive. It has been coincident with 
such waste in other ways and provocative of such expense in many forms that 
with increasing knowledge it has been outgrown and is being discarded." 
Chancellor Day of Syracuse University concludes a statement, which is too long 
to quote, but which I commend to your attention (page 32), with these words: 

" We want, therefore, the highest and noblest estate for our fellow workers 
who labor for wage. It should be inculcated as a common sentiment, not as a 
concession and in no form of charity. It must be arranged so that it is a right, 
as much as the right to trade at a profit, and to manufacture and to build, and 
to invest for legitimate gain. The workingman must be on the same plane with 
his prosperous neighbors." 

12 



Mr. Otto H. Kahn goes even farther in his application of the new principle of 
wages, saying (page 33): 

" The principle on which one should deal with the labor question is very 
simple. It is the principle of the Golden Rule. I think the formula should be 
that, first of all, labor is entitled to a living wage. After that, capital is entitled 
to a living wage. What is left over belongs to both capital and labor, in such 
proportion as fairness and equity and reason shall determine in all cases. 

* * * * 

" The worker must receive a wage which not only permits him to keep body 
and soul together, but to lay something by for a rainy day to take care of his 
wife and children, and to have his due share of the comforts, joys and recrea- 
tions of life." 
The economists are unanimous in their approval of the living wage. Most of 

them believed it of such vital importance to the welfare of the state that they 

would make it a matter of legislation. Prof. Jacob Hollander of Johns Hopkins 

University (page 37) states the case as follows: 

" A sufficient wage can best be assured the laborer by State intervention 
defining minimum wage conditions. This is the assertion of no new principle. 
From the beginning of modern factory legislation, the State has time and again 
intervened to establish a competitive base line in industrial enterprise when- 
ever it has become clear that free contract fails to insure conditions of employ- 
ment compatible with the social interest. In this manner the length of the 
working day, the employment of women and children, the safeguarding of 
dangerous processes, have heretofore been defined as to least favorable terms 
by legal enactment. The motive of such legislation has been to replace, by 
exercise of the State's police power, that minimum well-being which the wage- 
earner cannot secure for himself and which it is essential for the safeguarding 
of society that he should enjoy. The same intervention is now invoked to 
establish as a minimum wage — for less than which it shall not be lawful for 
employers to contract or laborers to engage — an amount not less than the 
necessary cost of maintaining the worker's family in health and decency." 
On the main question of the living wage J. Noble Stockett, Jr., of Dartmouth 

College, puts the case clearly (page 38): 

" The two fundamental principles which may fairly govern the wage determi- 
nations of arbitrators are the grant of a living wage to unskilled labor, and the 
maintenance of the standard of living of all employees. The first of these is 
the more important, since with the upper grades of labor, there is no question 
of their securing enough to insure a decent standard of living. 

" The maintenance of the standard of living is of utmost importance to 
society, and for this reason it is imperative that wages should advance in the 
same proportion as living costs increase. By the cost of living is meant not 
only the cost of food, but also the costs of rents, clothing, fuel and light, and 
sundries." 

* * * * 

Henry R. Seager, Professor of Economics, Columbia University, gives his conclu- 
sion that (page 41) : 

"To sum up my conclusions: The economic interest of society requires the 
payment of living wages to all workers, except, possibly, children learning 
trades and defectives, who must be treated as wards of the State." 
Charles A. Ellwood, Professor of Sociology of the University of Missouri, naming 
the ten conditions essential to a normal social life, gives as one condition (page 42) : 
. ..." (9) A minimum standard of life for all, sufficiently high to insure 
full nourishment, reasonable recreation, proper housing and the other elemen- 
tary necessities of life." 
The opinion of the economists is excellently summarized in the following quota- 
tion from the case for the national minimum issued by the National Committee for 
the Prevention of Destitution, London (page 42) : 

" The verdict of the economists is equally clear and emphatic. - Cheap labor ' 
they no longer regard as a blessing, but rather as a curse to an industrial com- 
munity. Low wages mean low efficiency and low consuming power. The 
recognized economic advantages of maintaining a high standard wage are: 

" 1. That it increases the efficiency of the workers by giving them a higher 
standard of living; and 

13 



" 2. That by preventing economies in wages it forces the competitive struggle 
on to a higher plane, the plane of efficiency. 

" High wages, by leading to improved machinery and more efficient organiza- 
tion, are in the long run the truest form of economy." (P. 4.) 
Harry F. Ward, Professor of Sociology, Boston University, has stated the religious 
necessity of the living wage (page 43) as follows: 

" The principle of the living wage was so thoroughly incorporated in the life 
of the Hebrew community that when Paul writes to Timothy he cites it in 
illustration of the truth that a good soldier of Jesus Christ must accept his 

share of suffering The harvest man who labors in the field must be 

the first to get a share of the crop In the face of the clear teaching 

of the Scripture, the church dare not fail to proclaim the necessity of a living 
wage. (If Christianity is to be expressed in a community life upon the earth, 
this principle is basic, and the pulpit must cry aloud without ceasing until it 
is put at the center of our industrial organization. In the face of modern 
social injustice, the church must ever uphold the ideal of a community life 
in which all persons have the means for full development, in order that this 
ideal may call economist, legislators and industrial leaders to work out the 
method by which it can be realized.) 

" A living wage for adult male workers means a wage that will support a 
family, because the highest welfare of the community demands that all m«n 
shall be able to maintain a family, and that the family life shall not be broken- 
down by the enforced labor of the mother and the children. The standard living 
wage for adult males is a wage which will maintain the average family of five — 
a man, wife and three children under 14." 
The churches, as organized bodies, have at some length given expression to their 
approval. The Social Service Committee of the Northern Baptist Convention 
(page 44), the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America (page 44), the 
Boards of Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church (page 44), the National 
Catholic War Council (page 44). 

The point of view of the Catholic Church toward the important question of the 
Jiving wage has been best expressed by Dr. John A. Ryan in his book, A Living 
Wage. In the year 1891, the late Pope Leo XIII formulated the doctrine of a mini- 
mum living wage and Dr. Ryan has given the theological, the historical, and the 
economic basis. So important is his statement that an extensive quotation has been 
submitted in the exhibit (page 45). It is worthy of careful reading. 

The famous pronouncement of the Twenty British Quaker Employers in 1898 con- 
tained this declaration (page 50) : 

" The principle is laid down that a minimum or basic wage should be estab- 
lished in every industry and that there should be a second wage dependent upon 
the capacity of the worker." 
So universal is this recognition becoming that it is now made a part of agreements 
between labor and capital. During the war the War Labor Conference Board, com- 
posed of representatives of the National Industrial Conference Board and the 
American Federation of Labor, agreed upon the constitution of the National War 
Labor Board which contained the pronouncement on the living wage which I have 
already quoted (page 52). It is appearing even in the commercial agreements, as 
for instance, in the agreement between the Grand Trunk Railway Company and the 
telegraphers (page 53) there is this statement: 

" There are many considerations entering into the question. In our view, there 
is the right of the men to receive a living wage, and that right is peramount." 
More striking, however, is the pronouncement in the official cardinal points of the 
labor policy agreed upon by the International Joint Conference Council in the 
printing industry. This Council, formed by agreement between the printing trades 
unions and the employing printers, has recently been organized. It has issued this 
statement of the cardinal points, the second point being (page 53) : 

" Second. The industry to pay at least a reasonable living wage. Scales 
below this to be adjusted in frank recognition of the basic principle involved." 
In the President's First Industrial Conference the employer group submitted a 
statement of principles which should govern the employment relation. This state- 
ment said (page 54) : 

. . . . " The wage should be so adjusted as to promote the maximum incentive 
consistent with health and well-being and the full exercise of individual skill 
and effort. Moreover, the business in each establishment and generally in 
industry should be so conducted that the worker should receive a wage sufficient 
to maintain him and his family at a standard of living that should be satis- 
factory to a right-minded man in view of the prevailing cost of living, which 

14 



should fairly recognize the quantity and quality of his productive effort and the 
value and length of his service, and reflect a participation on his part in the 
prosperity of the enterprise to which he is devoting his energy." .... 
The United States Chamber of Commerce, in its authorized principles of industrial 
relations, declared (page 54): 

" Wages should be adjusted with due regard to the purchasing power of the 

wage and to the right of every man to an opportunity to earn a living at fair 

wages, to reasonable hours of work and working conditions, to a decent home 

and to the enjoyment of proper social conditions." .... 

One of the most far-reaching pronouncements on the subject, however, has been 

uttered by Dr. Frederick P. Fish, Chairman of the National Industrial Conference 

Board, employer representative at the President's First Industrial Conference, 

former President of the American Bell Telephone Company and of the American 

Telegraph and Telephone Company. In the mind of Mr. Fish, an industry which 

could not afford to pay a decent wage was not worth perpetuating or aiding to exist. 

Mr. Fish said (page 55) : 

". . . . and also that any industry that is worth providing, that is worth 
perpetuating, ought to be able to pay everyone that enters into its employ a 
decent wage that will support him in a fair degree of comfort that is satis- 
factory to a right-minded man, and that will give him a chance for relaxation, a 
chance for saving something for old age or for accident." 
Finally, I wish to call your attention in the last part of the exhibit to the attitude 
of organized labor toward the living wage. This attitude was officially given expres- 
sion in two statements, one presented by the labor group at the President's Industrial 
Conference (page 57): 

" The right of all wage-earners, skilled and unskilled, to a living wage is 

hereby declared, which minimum wage shall insure the workers and their 

families to live in health and comfort in accord with the concepts and standards 

of American life." 

The other official statement was by the labor conference held in Washington in 

December, 1919 (page 57): 

" There is a widespread belief that wages should be fixed on a cost-of-living 
basis. This idea is pernicious and intolerable. It means putting progress in 
chains and liberty in fetters. It means fixing a standard of living and a standard 
of life and liberty which must remain fixed. America's workers can not accept 
that proposition. 

" They demand a progressively advancing standard of life. They have an 
abiding faith in a better future for all mankind. They discard and denounce a 
system of fixing wages solely on the basis of family bugets and bread bills. 
Workers are entitled not only to a living, but modern society must provide more 
than what is understood by the term ' a living.' It must concede to all workers 
a fairer reward for their contribution to society, a contribution without which 
a progressing civilization is impossible." 
Again, in the reconstruction program of the American Federation of Labor 
(page 58) : 

" The American standard of life must be maintained and improved. The value 
of wages is determined by the purchasing power of the dollar. There is no 
such thing as good wages when the cost of living in decency and comfort equals 
or exceeds the wages received. There must be no reduction in wages; in many 
instances wages must be increased. 

" The workers of the nation demand a living wage for all wage-earners, 

skilled or uunskilled — a wage which will enable the worker and his family to 

live in health and comfort, provide a competence for illness and old age, and 

afford to all the opportunity of cultivating the best that is within mankind." 

I content myself with merely calling attention to the statements in the Peace 

Treaty and the various political platforms approving the living wage. 



DEFINITION OF A LIVING WAGE. 

By a " living wage " is meant a wage that will support a worker and his family 
in health, decency and reasonable comfort. This is the consensus of opinion of 
economists, publicists and others who have expressed themselves on the subject. 
(See Exhibit entitled "The Sanction for a Living Wage.") In other words, a 
living wage does not mean an increase that will purchase fine raiment or extrava- 
gant amusements. Nor, on the other hand, does it mean a mere " subsistence " 

15 



income, an income that will supply just enough shelter to keep out the rain, just 
enough food to keep the family from being underfed, and just enough clothes to 
cover nakedness and keep the body warm. A convenient statement of the things 
a living wage should provide is contained in the report of the U. S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics on the cost of maintaining a family of five in Washington, D. C. The 
object of this study was to determine the minimum wage necessary for the support 
of a Government employee and his family. The study presents a budget which it 
states is intended to give for such a family: 

"(1) A sufficiency of nourishing food for the maintenance of health, par- 
ticularly the children's health; 

"(2) Housing in low-rent neighborhoods and within the smallest possible 
number of rooms consistent with decency, but with sufficient light, heat and 
toilet facilities for the maintenance of health and decency; 

"(3) The upkeep of household equipment, such as kitchen utensils, bedding 
and linen, necessary for health, but with no provision for the purchase of 
additional furniture; 

"(4) Clothing sufficient for warmth, of a sufficiently good quality to be 
economical, but with no further regard for appearance and style than is neces- 
sary to permit the family members to appear in public and within their narrow 
social circle without slovenliness or loss of self-respect. 

"(5) A surplus over the above expenditures which would permit of only a 
minimum outlay for such necessary demands as — 

(a) Street car fares to and from work and necessary rides to stores and 

markets; 

(b) The keeping up of a modest amount of insurance; 

(c) Medical and dental care; 

(d) Contributions to churches and labor or beneficial organizations; 

(e) Simple amusements, such as the moving pictures once in a while, 

occasional street car rides for pleasure, some Christmas gifts for the 
children, etc.; 

(f) Daily newspaper." 

That the level of living here had in mind was not an extravagant one is shown 
in the following comment in the report: 

" It needs to be emphasized that the budget level adopted in the present 
study is in no way intended as an ideal budget. It was intended to establish 
a bottom level of health and decency below which a family cannot go without 
danger of physical and moral deterioration. This budget does not include 
many comforts which should be included in a proper ' American standard of 
living.' Thus no provision is directly made for savings other than insurance, 
nor for vacations, nor for books and other educational purposes. 

" On the other hand, a family with the items listed in this budget should be 
able to maintain itself in health and modest comfort. It would have a suffi- 
ciency of food, respectable clothing, sanitary housing, and a minimum of the 
essential ' sundries.' " 



THE PRACTICABILITY OP THE LIVING WAGE. 

The study of the living wage or an American standard of living, has, therefore, 
passed from any criticism as to an idealistic visionary conception to that of a 
practical scientific matter, capable of practical analysis and practical application. 
The change has been exceedingly well expressed by the Bureau of Municipal Re- 
search, Philadelphia (Exhibit Number — Workingman's Standard of Living in 
Philadelphia, pp. 1 and 3). The representatives of this Bureau say: 

The Living-Wage Principle Accepted. 

" Nowadays very few persons object to the principle of a living wage. It is 
generally agreed that the humblest worker is entitled to a return for his services 
that will enable him to support himself and his family in decency and comfort 
and give his children a fair start in the world. If we have failed thus far to 
secure a living wage for all workers, it has been due largely to differences of 
opinion as to the methods to be employed and to a lack of understanding of 
what constitutes a living wage rather than to disapproval of its principle." .... 

16 



How to Remove This Obstacle. 

" The obvious need is for a definite statement, in terms of actual goods and 
services, of what constitutes a fair standard of living. This statement should 
be so explicit and detailed that it would be possible at any time to ascertain 
the current cost of each item enumerated therein and thus to arrive at the total 
cost of such a standard of living at existing price levels. With such a statement 
or standard before it, the appropriating body of the city will be able to find 
out in a very short time whether or not it is paying its laborers adequate wages, 
and if not, at what point wages must be fixed to make them adequate." 
Such quantitative studies have been worked out by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
the Philadelphia Bureau, the National Industrial Conference Board, for the Bitu- 
minous Coal Commission, and by special students. Data is now available and placed 
in readily usable form before this Commission to enable it to ascertain what a 
living wage or an American standard of living in the anthracite fields should be. 
Such data has been derived from original and practical investigations and scientific 
study and does not consist of unwarranted assertions as to what should prevail. 



THE COST OF THE MINIMUM OF SUBSISTENCE. 

The foregoing conservative estimates as to the amounts absolutely necessary for 
the maintenance of an average family of five persons on a bare subsistence level 
of physical needs only — food, fuel, clothing and shelter' — when brought up to May 
1, 1920, show the need of an annual earning or income amounting to $1772. 

This provides for a subsistence only just above a poverty level, and makes no 
provision whatsoever for comfort, health, savings, recreation or amusement. It is 
not put forward as a standard of what the family of anthracite mine-workers should 
be, but to show what it should not be. It does not represent our hopes of the eco- 
nomic status of the mine-worker, and we do not think that it is expected that the 
earnings of the mine-workers should be restricted to an amount sufficient only for 
meeting the animal needs for food, clothing and shelter — an amount which enables 
the mine worker by the slightest of margins to prevent his wife and children from 
becoming public charges. As a matter of fact, these estimates of subsistence 
standards represent what the deplorable financial condition of the mine-worker 
and his family is now and what it has been in past years. The mine-workers are 
now on the precarious level of mere subsistence. It is from these deplorable con- 
ditions that we wish to escape and we demand a living wage to the workers in the 
anthracite mines so that they and their families may arise from the economic 
darkness and despair which now engulfs them into the economic sunlight. We are 
wearied with long years and generations of mere existence. We now wish to have a 
sufficient opportunity to earn a wage which will command a decent standard of 
living and hope for the future. 






A MINIMUM STANDARD OF HEALTH AND REASONABLE COMFORT. 



What the mine-worker should have, and what the public would insist upon, if it 
really knew the facts, would be the establishment of such rates of pay and such 
opportunities for work, as would enable the mine-worker to earn a living wage. 
The amount of a living wage, or the amount necessary in industrial localities to 
maintain an average family on the basis of a minimum standard of health, and with 
a reasonable or small degree of comfort, on the basis of prices in May, 1920, as 
shown by the above estimates as conservatively worked out by the best authorities 
is an average annual wage or earning capacity of $2242. 



EARNINGS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN AN AMERICAN STANDARD 

OF LIVING. 

What a living wage should be as determined by authoritative budgetary studies is 
to be' found in employes Exhibit Number — . The amounts which accepted studies 
have demonstrated to be necessary to maintain on the basis of present prices either 

17 



a subsistence for an average family or a minimum of health and comfort may be 
briefly summarized, as follows: 

Yeably Cost of Various Family Budgets in May, 1920. 

(All of these budgets are based on a family of husband, wife and 
three children of dependent age.) 

Budget. 
SUBSISTENCE LEVEL. 

Wage-earners Budgets in New York City, Louise B. More. . .$1,787.90 

Standard of Living in New York City, R. C. Chapin . . . 1,890.00 

Family Budgets in Chicago Stockyards District, J. C. 

Kennedy and others 1,476.78 

Cost and Standards of Living in New York State, New York 

Factory Investigating Commission 1,764.25 

Cost of Living of Unskilled Laborer's Family, New York 

City, New York Bureau of Personal Service 1,582.40 

Suggested Family Budget, Social Service Bureau, Bellevue 

Hospital 1,642.75 

Subsistence Budget Submitted to National War Labor 

Board, W. F. Ogburn 1,833.68 

Suggested Budget for a Textile Mill Worker's Family, Little 

and Cotton 2,160.64 

Cost of Living Among Wage-earners in Fall River, Mass., 

National Industrial Conference Board 1,754.90 

Cost of Living Among Wage-earners in Lawrence, Mass., 

National Industrial Conference Board 1,832.13 

MINIMUM COMFORT LEVEL. 

Minimum Budgetary Estimate for Pacific Coast Workers, 

Jessica B. Peixotto 2,140.78 

Budget Awarded in Seattle and Tacoma Street Railway 

Arbitration 2,148.49 

Comfort Budget Submitted to National War Labor Board, 

W. F. Ogburn 2,329.14 

Budget for a Government Employee's Family in Wash- 
ington, D. C, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2,601.84 

Workingmen's Standard of Living in Philadelphia, Phila- 
delphia Bureau of Municipal Research 1,992.47 

Budget for Bituminous Coal Mine Workers, W. F. Ogburn. . 2,241.84 



THE CONSERVATISM OF THE ANTHRACITE WORKERS' DEMANDS. 

In the light of these statements, the conservatism of our demands is at once 
apparent. Our request is for a minimum living wage rate of only six dollars a day 
for the day worker. On our estimated operating time of 252 days a year, this would 
amount to a yearly wage of only $1452. On the operators claim of 272 working days 
a year, the annual earnings would be only $1632. Assuming that what has never 
happened before may be brought to pass, and conditions could be established under 
which the collieries would operate full time or 306 days a year, this would bring an 
average annual income to the lowest paid employees if they worked every day the 
mines were in operation of only $1836, or ah income which, on the basis of present 
prices, would insure only a bare physical subsistence to themselves and their 
families. 

According to the most extreme interpretation, therefore, our demands can only 
be construed as a request for a subsistence wage only for the lowest paid day 
workers, and for some small degree of health, comfort and decency for those of 
special skill, training and experience. 

It is for these reasons that we consider that whatever showing the operators 
may make before the Board as to the number of days worked last year, or as to the 
earnings of different classes of employees, is of small consequence upon your 
ultimate decision. Whatever the number of days the collieries may have been in 
operation, this number of days multiplied by the present rates of pay will not pro- 

18 



duce a living yearly income. Whatever amount the average earnings shown by the 
operators' pay roll data for last year may be, even if it reaches the average of 
$1509 a year which they claimed in the New York and Washington conferences, it 
will be far below what the best authorities show at present to be even a bare sub- 
sistence wage for an average wage-earner's family. 



BASES OF WAGE ADJUSTMENT. 

There have been three proposals as a basis for wage adjustment which have 
been discussed by the joint committee during the conferences which have preceded 
the creation of the Commission. They are as follows: 

The Increasing of Rates or Pay of Anthracite Mine-W'orkers to Correspond to 

Advances in the Cost of Living Since the Outbreak of the 

European War in 1914. 

This proposal is wholly unacceptable. It was a war-time measure or prin- 
ciple, arising from an agreement between organized labor and the Federal 
government, an emergency measure entirely, and has received our acquiescence 
only because of the emergency in which our government was placed. It was 
the basis of the relation of the anthracite mine-workers to the government or 
the public through the Fuel Administration. It was understood as a basis of 
war-time production that labor would not take advantage of the war period to 
secure excessive wage advances, and, on the other hand, the government, 
through the Fuel Administration, agreed to guarantee, by the fixing of wage- 
rates, that the pre-war rates of compensation, or, the real pre-war income of 
mine-workers, would be preserved by corresponding increases in money rates 
of pey to the anthracite mine-workers, should the purchasing power of his 
earnings be reduced by advances in the prices of food, fuel, clothing, housing 
and necessary incidentals of family consumption. By this agreement the pre- 
war economic status of the anthracite mine-workers theoretically was to be 
maintained. 

This principle, however, can not any longer receive our sanction. The war 
emergency has passed in fact, if not legally. To continue this method of wage 
adjustment would be equivalent to the placing of our sanction upon the con- 
tinuance of rates of pay and working and living conditions which were far 
below a decent level of subsistence and health, and which do not make possible 
at all the command of any of the elements of comfort and decent living, pro- 
tection against old age or incapacity for any cause. It would mean further 
the stamping with our approval a standard of earnings which are inadequate 
for the proper support of a family, and for making impossible the retention of 
our children in school until they have secured the essentials of public school 
training. It would mean now, as it has done before and during the war, the 
putting of our children and young persons to work when they should be receiv- 
ing an education, and the impairment of family life by the necessity of bringing 
boarders and lodgers into the homes of the mine-workers, as a source of family 
income to supplement the inadequate earnings at the mines of the heads of 
families who are miners or mine-workers. Moreover, the maintenance of this 
method of wage adjustments would leave the future without any hope to the 
anthracite miners of improving their status. The acceptance of this method 
by us during the war was based on patriotic grounds. We considered the war 
as a period of national danger in which the operators should not exact undue 
profits or labor excessive wages, but a period in which both should, without 
impairment, work together in the face of a common danger and for a common 
cause. 

The extent to which the anthracite mine-workers were true to their pledge 
and to the country is well-known. It is a matter of official records in the 
reports of the Fuel Administration during the war. Anthracite mine-workers 
not only did not profiteer during the war, but, from an economic standpoint, 
their condition was impaired by the war. They came out of the war in a worse 
condition than that in which they entered the conflict. Their deplorable and 
inadequate pre-war status was not even maintained. Their rates of pay were 
increased, but the cost of living advanced to a greater extent, and the cessation 
of hostilities found the anthracite mine-workers, as a whole, like the man in 
the Biblical parable whose " last state was worse than the first." The only 

19 



way by which our members during the war could maintain their pre-war 
standards of living was to work harder and longer, and with the termination 
of the conflict even this opportunity was denied to them because of the restric- 
tions for a time on the markets for coal. For the sake of our country we 
endured these conditions while we were at war. We cannot endure them 
longer. To extend our acceptance of the increased cost-of-living principle 
further in making wage agreements would be to assist in perpetrating the 
deplorable standards of compensation which prevailed in the anthracite region 
before we entered the World War. In fixing wages in the bituminous branch 
of the industry, neither the majority nor minority reports of the President's 
Coal Commission accepted this principle as the basis of their reasoning, or 
justified their wage awards upon it. We cannot any longer agree to its use 
or consider it a primary, regulatory force. 

Adjustment of the Rates of Pay of Anthracite Mine-Workers on a Parity 
with Those of Bituminous Mine-Workers. 

This basis of wage adjustment represents the minimum which we can con- 
sider. No valid reason has been advanced and there is none to show why^ 
anthracite mine-workers should not receive at least the same rates of pay as* 
the workers in bituminous coal mines. We have decided to base our claims 
upon this principle, not because it is satisfactory, but for the reason that it 
seems the most practicable course, all things considered, at the present time. 
The rates of pay of bituminous mine-workers even after the application of the 
increases awarded by the Majority Report of the President's Coal Commission, 
are inadequate. This is recognized by the Majority Report. It states that the 
principle that the mine-workers should have a Living Wage or American 
standard of compensation should be recognized and accepted, and, while the 
increases in rates of pay granted were considered to be a step towards this 
basis of compensation by the Commission, they were by no means considered 
to represent a Living Wage or an American standard of living. 

In the anthracite industry, we are willing to accept the increases and rates 
established by the President's Bituminous Coal Commission as a step toward 
a living wage or an American standard of living. In this connection it should 
be carefully borne in mind, however, that we mean not merely the increases 
in terms of cents or per cents granted by the Bituminous Commission. It is 
necessary for us to have the minimum rate of six dollars a day for adult 
workers which now prevails in the bituminous fields and corresponding increases 
according to occupation above this basic rate. By this method of application 
only would the lower paid employees in the anthracite mines be assured of a 
bare subsistence wage, and the more trained and skilled of earnings sufficient 
to maintain their standards of living. The bituminous award, as thus applied, 
represents the irreducible minimum which we should receive. 

A Living Wage or an American Standard of Living. 

This basis of compensation is the only one which would be acceptable 
to us — a rate of compensation which would enable the average anthracite mine- 
worker to support his family according to American standards of living, or, 
in other words, on the basis of a standard of health, decency, and reasonable 
comfort. The anthracite mine-workers before the war barely received a sub- 
sistence wage — a wage hardly sufficient for animal needs alone. As a matter 
of fact, it was not a subsistence wage, for it was not adequate for the physical 
and decent requirements of an average family, and it was necessary in order 
to piece out a mere subsistence for the children of the mine-workers to seek 
work, and for the miner's wife to take boarders and lodgers to supplement the 
inadequate earnings of the head of the household. We should now have our 
rates of compensation so increased as to assure us that all anthracite mine- 
workers, including ordinary, adult laborers, will be able to earn a living wage, 
or, in other words, a decent, comfort wage, adequate for the support of an 
average family in a representative mining community, in health and according 
to reasonable American standards. 

This principle has already been officially and authoritatively recognized. 
As a war-time measure, it received the support of the Federal Government in 
President Wilson's proclamation of April 8, 1918, in creating the National War 
Labor Board. At Paris, in negotiating the Treaty of Peace after the war, this 

20 



same principle received the sanction of the enlightened opinion of the civilized 
world, and the guarantee of a living wage for industrial workers was embodied 
in the so-called labor provisions of the final draft of the Treaty of Peace. It 
was recognized and accepted as fundamental as already pointed out by the 
recent majority report of the President's Coal Commission, which says (p. 36) 
that, " In arriving at the present wage award, ive were guided by the principle 
that every industry must support its workers in accordance with the American 
standard 0/ living." A further sanction of the principle was given in clear-cut 
and unequivocal form by the Industrial Conference recently called by President 
Wilson for the purpose of formulating a constructive program for regulating 
industrial conditions and relations and bringing about a greater measure of 
industrial peace. In its final report of March 6, 1920, this Conference of promi- 
nent, public-spirited members stated, " It is fundamental that the basic wages 
of all employes should be adequate to maintain the employe and his family 
in reasonable comfort, and with adequate opportunity for the education of his 
children. When the wages of any group fall below this standard for any length 
of time, the situation becomes dangerous to the well-being of the State. Every 
consideration of elementary economic justice leads to the conclusion that this 
Joint Conference should proceed to an agreement upon the basis of this prin- 
ciple. No other principle except that of a living wage will be acceptable to us." 



THE HAZARDS OF ANTHRACITE MINING. 

The conclusions shown by our exhibit may be briefly summarized as follows: 

1. A prominent authority states " Probably no industry is so subject to excep- 
tional hazards as the coal industry." 

2. The general mortality of the anthracite miner is distinctly above the 
average for all occupied males. 

3. A large and representative life insurance company will accept coal miners 
only if they pay rates for 16 years above the actual age and even then will permit 
them to have no cheaper form of policy than a 20 year endowment; only one 
other occupation is subjected to more drastic conditions. 

4. The Director of the United States Bureau of Mines stated '"The hazard of 
(coal) mining is undeniably on the increase." 

5. The latest anthracite report of the Pennsylvania Department of Mines states 
that in spite of increased inspections there has been no decrease in the fatalities 
in or about the mines. 

6. A Bulletin of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics states: "Throughout 
every year of the working period of life, the mortality of coal miners includes a 
relatively much higher proportion of deaths from accidents than is found to 
prevail among all occupied males." 

7. The personal accident insurance companies impose strict limitations on the 
occupation of coal miner and will grant only a minimum amount of insurance- 
printers and machinists are given five and six times more insurance protection 
than the coal miner. 

8. The leading causes of death are respiratory diseases and industrial accident. 

9. The non-fatal accidents in the Pennsylvania anthracite field in 1916 disabled 
about one-sixth of the entire working force for a greater or less period. 

10. Where the injury did not cause death, it most frequently caused disability 
in the arms and legs, with resulting inability to resume mine work on recovery. 

11. The Report of the Pennsylvania States Commission and Old Age Pensions 
states " Miners Age prematurely." 



THE SANCTION OF UNION RECOGNITION. 

The desire for law and order in industry is the greatest common denominator of 
the minds of men today. The desire for cheap goods, the greed for profits, the craving 
for power, the hope for surety of employment, the struggle to realize great con- 
structive programs, may all separate widely one man from another, but the indis- 
pensable preliminary which binds together the individuals who hold these diverse 
purposes is that production must be stabilized by the substitution of law and order 
for senseless anarchy and disorder. 

Law and order, however, are the products of organization, and law and order in 
industry can come only when organization in all of its parts has been completed. 

21 



Since the beginning of modern industry a little over a century ago it has been 
struggling blindly to organize itself. Capital came into modern industry out of the 
past with some organization, but well protected by centuries of law and ages of tradi- 
tional respect, and under that protection has continued the development of its 
organization. But the worker came alone, with even the law prohibiting him from 
seeking protection through joint action with his fellows. Facing hostility and opposi- 
tion and misrepresentation, hampered by his own ignorance as well as the stupidity 
and ignorance of his opponents, he has struggled for more than a century to bring 
law and order into industry. He has had to win the protection of the law; he has 
had to force consideration by capital; he has had to compel the philosophers and 
the scientists to understand him. And he has accomplished it; and accomplished 
it in the only way that any progress is accomplished — by organization. 

Throughout all industrial countries that organization has grown. For the United 
States though it has been far behind the industrial development of England and the 
European industrial countries. The trades unions have grown from a membership 
in 1897 of 444,500 to an estimated membership in 1920 of 5,000,000 (pp. 163). 

Today even the resistant Tory employer recognizes the right of labor to organize, 
while the constructive minded man, be he employer, statesman, or scientist, declares 
emphatically that the good of society demands the organization of labor. So general 
has this recognition become that there is echoed on every side the hope of the. 
National Catholic War Council " that this right will never again be called into 
question by any considerable number of employers." 

I offer for your consideration Employees' Exhibit No. — , being a compilation of 
the personal testimony, the official pronouncements, and the actual practice of 
society toward unionism. 

I need make no extensive reference to the evidence in this exhibit supporting 
the recognition of the necessity and the inevitability of unionism. That evdence is 
on every page, coming from statesmen, churches, courts, governments, organized 
employers and individual employers, economists, and legislatures. The history, 
the facts, and the logic of this general recognition are so admirably epitomized in 
the statement of Edwin R. A. Seligman (page 81) that I content myself with offering 
it as representative. 

" The justification of trade unions was long disputed. Under the early law 
they were illegal as conspiracies. It was not until 1824 that they were legiti- 
mized in England, and not until much later that the free right of association was 
conceded elsewhere. The recognition that is today almost universally accorded 
them rests on the economic principles that in the modern labor contract the 
conditions of work have become collective or group conditions, and that the 
bargaining to be equal must be collective or group bargaining. The individual 
workman is nowadays helpless against the typical employer. In a railway or a 
large factory work is carried on under broad general rules. The laborer who 
forms one of a group of tens, of hundreds, or of thousands, of workmen cannot 
expect to bargain successfully as an individual. His only hope lies in association. 
Freedom of contract is illusory because of the self-evident inequality. The 
trades union is an attempt to restore to the individual as a member of the group 
the equality which has been lost through the transition from small-scale to 
large-scale industry. The trades-union is as inevitable a product of modern 
economic life as the corporation. The one is an association of labor, the other 
an association of capital; both are attempts to attain individual prosperity 
through concerted efforts." 
Organizations do not, however, exist simply for the sake of organization. They 
come into being and live for purposive action. The trade unions is brought into 
being with the purpose of collective bargaining to protect the individual in his weak- 
ness against the aggression and injustice of the organization to whom he must sell 
his services. But as the trade union becomes strong enough to accomplish this 
primary purpose it becomes strong enough to assume responsibility, time and wis- 
dom enough to acquire a wider vision of industry, and a desire from the point of view 
of that wider vision to take part in the strengthening, the extension, and the welfare 
of the industry as a whole. It then becomes a true partner in industry, bound up 
with the productive and financial success or failure of that industry. The union 
thus becomes a stabilizer, a power for discipline. But it can develop none of its 
ultimate good, nor can organized capital receive from it its ultimate good unless it 
receives from organized capital the recognition which places the official of the union 
on the level of business associate, working with him to the end that production may 
be increased, costs lowered, employment made stable, wages made fair and working 
conditions just, and discipline maintained. These results have been accomplished. 
They can always be accomplished where organized employer and organized employee 

22 



come together without hostility and with the determination to bring law and order 
into industry. 

In support of this contention I call your attention to some of the testimony in the 
exhibit offered. 

First, however, let me call your attention to some statements of the churches 
which show how their hope of a better order of industrial society is based upon their 
belief in collective bargaining: 

Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America (page 17) : 

" Democracy must be applied to the government of industry as well as to the 
government of the nation." 
Pastoral letter by the Board of Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church 
(page 17) : 

" We favor collective bargaining as an instrument for the attainment of 
industrial justice and for training in democratic procedure." 
Presbyterian Church, General Assembly (page 17) : 

Gives hearty approval in a resolution to the following statement by President 
Wilson: " The object of all reform in this essential matter must be the genuine 
democratization of industry, based upon a full recognition of the right of those 
who work, in whatever rank, to participate in some organic way in every decision 
which directly affects their welfare or the part they are to play in industry." 
Social Service Committee of the Northern Baptist Convention (page 18) : 

" As steps toward full industrial democracy; provision for organization of the 

workers with collective bargaining " 

General Assembly, Presbyterian Church in Canada (page 18) : 

". . . . toward giving the workers a voice in determining the conditions under 
which their work is to be done and a proper share in the control of industry." 
I now wish to call your attention to a class of testimony which is typified by the 
following statement of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission of 1903 (page 22) : 

" Experience shows that the more full the recognition given to a trade union, 
the more business-like and responsible it becomes. Through dealing with 
business men in business matters its more intelligent, conservative, and 
responsible members come to the front and gain general control and direction of 
its affairs. If the energy of the employer is directed to discouragement and 
repression of the union he need not be surprised if the more radically inclined 
members are the ones most frequently heard." 
The Commission also declared: 

" We believe this (the value of a trade agreement), especially when it is con- 
sidered that in other directions, and in other industries, such agreements have 
been made and adhered to, for terms of years, completely avoiding strikes and 
labor controversies generally/ - 
The Commission on Industrial Relations, 1916 (page 24), came to this conclusion 
relative to joint agreements: 

" Joint agreements on the whole are well kept. There is a constant increase 
in the sense of moral obligation on the part of both employers and unions. Viola- 
tions cf agrements on the part of a small number of men or of a single employer 
occasionally occur. It is found that the unions condemn by fine or by other 
disciplinary measures such infractions of their members." 
The famous Whitley Committee in England (page 26) repeated its emphatic 
statement: 

" It may be desirable to state here our considered opinion that an essential 

condition in securing a permanent improvement in the relations of employers 

and employed is that there should be adequate organization on the part of both 

employers and work people." 

In the report of the Inquiry into Industrial Unrest, Great Britain (page 27), is 

found this statement: 

" The best security for industrial peace is organization of both employers and 

employed. If the men are badly organized the result is unauthorized local 

strikes; if the employers are not strongly federation, you have a minorty who 

refuse to pay the district rate." 

The Canadian Royal Commission on Industrial Relations, in the report of its 

examination into the causes of unrest (page 27), stated as among the chief causes 

of unrest were: 

" Denial of the right to organize and refusal to recognize unions. 
" Denial of collective bargaining." 
The same Commission in another part of its report declared: 

" When the employers engaged in one line of industry are organized and their 
respective employees are also formed into a central organization, bargaining 

23 



between the two groups would have the advantage from the point of view of 
competition of equalizing wages, hours, and other conditions affecting costs." 
The British Board of Trade in its report on collective agreements (page 28) 
expressed this opinion: 

" The wide prevalence of these arrangements in our most important indus- 
tries must have an important influence on industrial enterprise, and when the 
level of wages, the length of the working day, and other principal conditions 
of employment are regulated, for specified periods of greater or less duration, 
by clearly defined agreements, the employers concerned must be enabled to cal- 
culate with precision that part of the cost of production which will be repre- 
sented by labor; further, when these agreements bind the whole or a very large 
proportion of the firms engaged in a given trade, the danger of undercutting by 
rivals who find it impossible to obtain labor at a lower price is materially 
reduced." 
Justice Brandeis has said (page 36): 

" . . . . but the service which the labor unions can render in the future 
are even greater than they have rendered in the past. The employer needs the 
unions ' to stay him from the fall of vanity '; the employees need them for their 
protection; the community needs them to raise the level of the citizen. Strong 

stable trades unions can best serve these ends Peace and prosperity, 

therefore, are not to be attained by any attempt to weaken trade unions. Our 
hope lies rather in their growing strength." 
Commenting on the trade agreements in the stove industry, Boris Emmet says 
(page 44) : 

" The conference agreements are unique in the sense that not once in the 
twenty-six years of their existence did there arise any question which proved 
impossible of solution. Most delicate and vital problems, such as the regula- 
tion of apprenticeship, introduction of labor-saving machinery, limitation of 
output, wages, etc., have been amicably solved in a manner mutually satis- 
factory." 
One of the most interesting testimonials is that of Hart Schaffner and Marx of 
Chicago who, in commenting upon the operation of their trade agreement and its 
manner of execution, have said (page 55) : 

" Not the least of the advantages we have derived from our system is the 
reaction of the ideas and ideals, first applied in the labor department, upon 
the other departments and particularly upon the executive staff of the manu- 
facturing department. Inefficient methods as to prevailing conditions on the 
part of higher executives; these could not long survive when every complaint 
brought by a workman was thoroughly investigated and the root cause of the 
trouble brought to light. 

" The unexpected and indirect results of our labor policy in increasing the 
efficiency, reforming the conduct, and raising the intelligence of the executives 
coming into contact with the system have been as profitable and satisfactory 
as the direct result, i. e., the creation of harmony and good will on the part of 
the people toward the company." 
Out of the extracts from the Daily News Record, New York, the organ of the 
employers of the clothing trades, I select a few characteristic examples: 
Editorial, April 26 (page 59): 

" The fact that the greatest part of the clothing industry has recognized that 
the collective bargaining principle is the only road to industrial peace and 
security, and that the only markets at the present time in which there are no 
stoppages of work are the markets that have such agreements, is pointed out as 
significant and illustrative of the trend of things." 
May 16 (page 60) .... Max L. Holtz, President of the Clothiers' Exchange, 
(Rochester) said: 

" The Clothiers' Exchange congratulates the Chicago manufacturers upon 

their action (signing an agreement with the union). They evidently have come 

to realize, as Rochester did earlier, that it was necessary to deal with their 

employees under collective bargaining agreements with responsible leaders in 

charge of the union." 

October 9 (page 63) .... Dr. A. J. Todd, a labor manager of the House of 

Kuppenheimer, and also one of the three comprising the board of labor managers 

of the Chicago market .... (said): 

" In the first place orderly collective action has been set up as against direct 
action and anarchy. The general collective interest of the industry as a whole 
has been substituted for purely individualistic pressing of private interests. 
That is to say, the market is considered as superior to the interests of one 

24 






local union or section of the union or the whole union for that matter. Both 
manufacturers and leaders of the Amalgamated Union are learning to think in 

terms of the industry In the third place, the idea of law and order, 

strength by the use of reliable, formal contracts which are drawn up with 
regard not to some abstract ideas but to the concrete possibilities of their 
indorsement." 
December 29 (page 64). Captain E. H. M. Lowndes, assistant labor manager of 
the market: 

'*.... It is generally felt that the agreement with the Amalgamated has 
done much to stabilize conditions in the Toronto market and both parties to 
the said agreement seem to be well pleased with the settled conditions." 
The Industrial Committee of the Merchants' Association of New York (page 69) 
recommended: 

" The establishment of a recognized and permanent method of conference 
between the employer and his employees Conferences at which all sub- 
jects of mutual interest may be presented are essential to the development of 
understanding and mutual confidence." 
Mr. V. Ever it Macy, former chairman of the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board 
(page 72) says: 

" Local organizations cannot long survive if they act without the approval of 
the national bodies. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to strengthen 
the hands of the responsible trade union officials." 
Mr. Thomas J. Hogan, Secretary of the Stove Founders' National Defense Asso- 
ciation (page 72) testified before the Commission on Industrial Relations as follows: 
"Commissioner: You say then that the chief advantage of dealing with 
unions is due to the fact that you have had industrial peace? 
" Mr. Hogan: Yes .... 

"Commissioner: Do you get higher efficiency from members of the unions 
than you do from the average non-union men? 
"Mr. Hogan: No question about it." 
Dr. George Gorham Groat, Professor of Economics, University of Vermont 
(page 85), gives this testimony: 

" On the whole the evidence seems conclusive that where the trade agree- 
ment is developed on conservative lines and entered into in good faith by both 
parties, it acts decisively as a steadying influence. It has been shown as a 
matter of fact that where well-adjusted trade agreements are in force and are 
respected alike by both parties the mutual confidence inspired leads to the 
elimination of many of the objectionable practices centering around the restric- 
tion of membership or of output on the part of the workmen and the speeding 
up processes and nerve exhausting paces insisted upon by the employer. Inter- 
esting evidence is stated by the recent reports of the Massachusetts Bureau: 
' It would appear from a study of the prevalence of collective agreements and 
from the numerous awards which have been made by boards of arbitration in 
this state (Massachusetts) that the industrial agreement as an instrument for 
securing industrial harmony is being accepted with increasing favor by both 
employers and employees.' " 
F. T. Carlton (page 93) : 

" Unionism at its best, as in the case of the stove molders, has in a large 
measure actually transferred competition from price-slashing and wage-cutting 
to a struggle for better quality in product. The true competitive ideal is not 
absolute unregulated jungle competition, but competition according to certain 
rules of the game which tend to prevent the degradation of the worker and the 
deterioration of the product." 
The testimony of Mr. A. E. Suffern (page 94) , is too long to quote but too excellent 
to shorten. It will well repay reading. 

Attention is also called to the very excellent statement of Mr. William F. 
Willoughby given on page 96. 

A strong trade union, therefore, meeting the organized employer on a business 
basis, tends to peace, harmony, stability, improved conditions for both the employer 
and the employee. The first requisite for the accomplishment of these results has 
been shown by the testimony already introduced to be the recognition of the union 
and the resultant strengthening of the union officials by dealing with them. But the 
testimony goes further and shows that the desired law and order in industry must 
be based on trade agreements, which correspond to the constitution in the political 
state. The recognition specifically of the - trade agreements is even stated by the 
churches. 

25 



The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America (page 17) declares: 
" Trade agreements between employers and labor organizations can make pro- 
vision for joint settlement of grievances, for guarantees against aggression by 
the employers or the men, for willful limitation of output, for a shop discipline 
that should be educative and shall make for efficiency by promoting good will." 
The Ccmmission on Industrial Relations (page 24) came to the following very 
definite conclusion: 

" The conditions of employment can be most satisfactorily fixed by joint agree- 
ments between associations of employers and trade unions. 

* * * * 
The extension of joint agreements as regards not only the field of industry 
which they cover and the class of labor included, but the subjects which are 
taken up for negotiation and settlement. Greater responsibility for the char- 
acter, skill, and conduct of their members should accompany the greater partici- 
pation of trade unions in the government of industry. 
From the thirty-third annual report of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
(page 25) : 

" The Bureau has cited in its chronology the growing importance of joint 
trade agreements and the acceptance of such agreements has constantly in- 
creased It has been proven that in manufacturing centers where joint 

trade agreements exist in the principal industries there is comparatively little 
cessation from work on account of strikes and lockouts." 
Dr. George Gorham Groat (page 85) says: 

" Narrowly construed, these agreements have for their purpose the prevention 
of strikes and lockouts. They are akin to mediation, conciliation and arbitration 
in that they tend to industrial peace. . . . The trade agreement is broader than 
this. It seeks to eliminate possible points of dispute. While a comprehensive 
trade agreement will provide methods of settling differences, this is secondary 
in importance. Primarily it assumes that normally there will be no need for 
them. It arranges working relations instead of fighting relations. Only when 
the working relations are disturbed does the agreement aid in presenting the 

substitution of fighting relations John Mitchell does not exaggerate 

when he says that the ' hope of future peace in the industrial world lies in 4 ,he 
trade agreement' " 
Dr. Groat quotes (page 86) Mr. John Graham Brooks as saying: 

" If anywhere in the future the wage system is to be modified in the direction 
of more cooperative and democratic methods, the joint agreement in some 
form has to be strengthened and extended. For the kind of education wc most 
need, politically and industrially, I do not know a more disciplining agency now 
working in the United States than the joint agreement, as it may be sse^D, for 
example, in our soft coal districts and among the longshoremen and cigar 
makers and stove makers." 
Prof. John R. Commons (page 87) : 

" The most important result of these trade agreements is the new feeling of 
equality and of respect which springs up in both employer and employee." 
Commons and Andrews (page 87): 

" While it is in force the trade agreement is the supreme law of the industry." 
Dr. F. J. Warne (page 96) : 

" Its successful operation proves the existence of a practical method of doing 

away with industrial wars It does tend, however, to preserve industrial 

harmony, secure more stable market and labor conditions, and reduce to a mini- 
mum the possibility of strikes and lockouts." 
I wish at this point to call particular atention to two exhibits worthy of very 
thoughtful consideration. On page 135 is given an extract from the report of the 
Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor, mentioning a bill that was 
introduced into Congress providing for the punishment of employers who refuse to 
bargain collectively with their employees. The Executive Council disclaims any 
interest in the bill, explaining that: 

" In the demand for collective bargaining labor has never asked that it be 

gained by law. It must ccme through the evolution in the minds of employers 

who will be induced to accept it because of its advantages." 

The other point I wish you to consider is the testimony presented on page 139 of 

two officials of the I. W. W. Adolph Lessig, Secretary of the National Industrial 

Union of Textile Workers, I. W. W., testified as follows: 

" Commissioner: Do you have any policy of making any agreements with the 
employers? 

26 



Mr. Lessig : Well, we have come to the conclusion that It was not good policy 
to make an agreement because they would not keep it anyway. 
Commissioner: That is your only reason? 

Mr. Lessig: Well, principally. We don't believe we ought to have our hands 
tied. We believe we ought to be free to take advantage of every opportunity, the 
same as he does." 
Vincent St. John, Secretary of the I. W. W., testified to the same commissioner as 
follows : 

"Commissioner: Do you maintain that the idea of collective bargaining or 
agreements should not be recognized? You said that in industry you don't believe 
in collective agreements. 

"Mr. St. John: I don't believe in collective agreements, so far as the wage 
workers are concerned; no. 

* * * * 

"Mr. St. John: One local union was expelled for entering into an agreement 
with the employers in Great Falls, Montana." 
The significance of these statements are obvious. 

The national agreement is not merely a hope — it is a reality. As a reality with 
years of experience behind it, it can in several industries be observed as pointing the 
way to the new era in industry. The stove industry, the glass bottle industry, and the 
printing industry have carried on successfully national trade union agreements for 
many years. The printing industry has within the last few months, after many 
years of national trade agreements, made the final step in its development by 
establishing under agrement the International Joint Conference Council of the 
Commercial and Periodical Branches of the Printing Industry. Within the last few 
months the National Association of Electrical Contractors and Dealers and the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers have entered into an agreement 
for the establishment of a joint council. The men's clothing industry, after suc- 
cessful market agreements in the principal men's clothing centers of the country, 
have organized the National Industrial Federation of Clothing Manufacturers, and 
developed an agreement with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. In section 5, The 
National Agreement, of the exhibit, fuller references to these employment agree- 
ments are given. Of all these industries what Mr. Chenery (page 48) says of the 
printing trades is true: 

" Thus the printing trades are building for themselves a system of economic 
government and of industrial law .... but at the same time they have given 
striking testimony to the direction in which industry is now marching." 
To understand the full meaning of the spirit in which these industries are work- 
ing I need but quote the statement of the electrical contractors (page 49) : 

" But unlike most organizations of employers, the purpose of this group was 

not to fight organized labor, but to work with it; not to control labor, but to 

cooperate with it to the end that both employees and employers should benefit." 

For a full statement of this same spirit I commend for careful reading the preamble 

of the Hart Schaffner and Marx agreement (page 51). 

I have already quoted from the report of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission of 
1903. I wish now to call your attention to further statements in that report. The 
miners had asked (page 21-22): 

" Incorporation in an agrement between the United Mine Workers of America 

and the anthracite coal companies of the wages which shall be paid and the 

conditions of employment which shall obtain, together with satisfactory methods 

for the adjustment of grievances which may arise from time to time, to the end 

that strikes and lockouts may be unnecessary." 

The United Mine Workers of America were not, however, parties to the submis- 
sion of the case. The Commission consequently decided that it had not jurisdic- 
tion to award an agreement between the United Mine Workers and the companies. 
I But the Commission expressed itself as follows: 
" Whatever the jurisdiction of this Commission under the submission may be, 
the suggestion of a working agreement between employers and employees 
embodying the doctrine of collective bargaining is one which the Commission 
believes contains many hopeful developments for the adjustment of relations 
in the mining region 
". . . . And, were it within the scope of its jurisdiction, the said fourth 
demand of the statement of claims for collective bargaining and a trade agree- 
ment might then be reasonably granted. 



" The Commission has carefully considered and has outlined a plan for an 
organization for the execution of trade agreements in the anthracite region, to 

27 



which thoughtful attention is called and which is printed in full as an appendix. 
" When, under the award, the parties have faithfully obeyed its terms and 
thus learned to deal with each other, a trade agreement may commend itself 
to both sides." 
And I again call attention to the testimony of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commis- 
sion already quoted (page 22): 

" Experience shows that the more full the recognition given to a trades union, 
the more businesslike and responsible it becomes. Through dealing with 
business men in business matters, its more intelligent, conservative and respon- 
sible members come to the front and gain general control and direction of its 
affairs. If the energy of the employer is directed to discouragement and repres- 
sion of the union he need not be surprised if the more radically inclined mem- 
bers are the ones most frequently heard." 
This is the testimony and this the evidence. 

They show that trade unions, like individuals, develop in effectiveness, in effi- 
ciency, in stability, in helpfulness, to the degree that responsibility is put upon 
them. They show that the trend of industry is to the recognition of the unions and 
to the growing appreciation of the results of the trade agreement. 

We believe that the time has now come when there should be realized the hope 
of the first coal commission, that 

" a trade agreement between operators and an anthracite mine workers' 
organization may commend itself to both sides." 
We therefore ask that such an agreement be made a part of this award. 



IRREGULARITY OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE ANTHRACITE COAL INDUSTRY. 

We have submitted in our exhibit (Number — ) to the Commission data as to the 
number of days worked in the anthracite industry since the year 1881. During this 
period the variation has been very great. The greatest number of days worked 
was 293 in the abnormal year 1918, while 1902, the year of the great anthracite strike, 
shows only 116 days of operation. For more normal years the greatest number of 
days worked was 257 in 1913, while the lowest point came in 1897 with only 150 days 
of operation. 

A careful examination of these data point to the following general conclusions 
in regard to the anthracite coal industry : 

(1) The anthracite mine-workers have suffered more from irregularity of employ- 
ment than have the bituminous mine workers, whose state is admitted by all to be 
deplorable. 

Not only is the average number of working days in anthracite lower than in 
bituminous, but the extremes are greater. 

During the period since 1881 the anthracite workers have had an opportunity to 
work on an average only 212 days out of each year. This means 92 days of idleness, 
30 per cent of the working year during which they have no opportunity to earn a 
living wage. In obtaining this average the abnormally low figure for 1902 due to the 
protracted strike has been left out, but the abnormally high figures for 1917 and 1918 
have been included. Were the figure for 1902 included, the average for anthracite 
would be even lower. 

This average, 212 working days, compares with 229 days of operation in the 
bituminous mines of Pennsylvania, and with 216 in those of the entire country. The 
bituminous figures represent averages for the period since 1892. If figures for the 
same period for anthracite had been averaged the days worked would be found to be 
210. Comparison with Pennsylvania bituminous is fairer because all the anthracite 
fields of major importance are in that state. 

(2) Shortage of labor does not enter appreciably into this problem of a part-time 
industry — the chief difficulty having been over-supply of labor as well as of capital. 
The sufferings of the workers from unemployment may be directly traced to a bad 
policy of investment during the days of unregulated competition. This has not only 
injured the worker but has also caused high prices for coal. 

(3) The problem of car shortage as a cause of irregularity, so much in evidence 
in the bituminous industry, has played so small a role in the anthracite industry as 
to be almost negligible. 

(4) The fundamental cause of irregularity has been "no market." In other 
words, the equipment and labor force have been more than adequate to produce the 
supply which the market has been ready to absorb. The anthracite market has 
become primarily that of a domestic fuel. The determining factors in this market 

28 



are, therefore, weather and growth of population. Other fuels are beginning to 
compete with anthracite in its own domestic sphere. In order to estimate the 
probable number of days which will be averaged in future years it will be necessary 
to form a judgment as to the probable future of the market in relation to possible 
production. From this and from data for the last decade it would appear that the 
market for anthracite in the future will remain in a state of equilibrium at about the 
level for the years 1910 and 1916, inclusive. 

(5) This will mean that the maximum average days per year which may fairly 
be expected will be about 242, leaving the worker to face unemployment for 20 per 
cent of the working year. From the consideration of other factors, which are dis- 
cussed at length in our exhibits, this would appear to be a conservative estimate, the 
probability being that there will be more idle days rather than less. 

(6) It is probable that had there not been over-investment in the anthracite 
industry, the problem could have been met by reducing the hours of labor without 
adding to the present price of anthracite coal. 



EARNINGS OF ANTHRACITE WORKERS. 

The average earnings of all anthracite workers employed inside the mines accord- 
ing to official returns were $1173 in 1919. Those employed outside the mines aver- 
aged $979, and the grand total of all workers, both inside and outside, was $1126. 
These figures are based upon a survey made by the United States Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, covering a half month pay-roll period when the mines were all working 
full time. The earnings for some of the more important occupations as thus given 
are as follows: 

Occupation. Earnings in 1919. 

Contract Miners $1432 

Contract Miners' laborers 900 

Other inside laborers 993 

Outside laborers 935 

Company miners 987 

Company miners' laborers 977 

Consideration miners 1156 

Pumpmen 1267 

Carpenters 1337 

Engineers • 1328 

Firemen 1163 

During the extended conferences as to wage adjustments which took place be- 
tween the joint committee of the operators and of the mine workers, the representa- 
tives of the operators claimed that their pay rolls for 1919 showed considerably 
higher earnings, or an average of $1509 for the year. We have had no access to 
data as to earnings beyond those to be found in governmental reports and other 
authoritative inquiries, and have not had an opportunity to examine any pay rec- 
ords of the various collieries. Our information has, therefore, been necessarily lim- 
ited to the sources mentioned. 

We wish, however, to give formal notice, and at this time to make formal 
request of the Commission that the representatives of the coal mining companies be 
required to submit comprehensive copies of these pay records to the Commission 
so that we may have an opportunity to examine and verify them, and so that the 
Commission may be able to form an acceptable and satisfactory conclusion as to 
what the actual earnings of the different classes of anthracite mine workers are. 
r hatever the earnings may be, as shown by satisfactory pay roll data, will give us 

lo concern, but will strengthen our complaint for we shall be able to demonstrate 
to the satisfaction of the Commission that annual earnings of this amount not only 
are far below the sum necessary for a wage earner to maintain his family on the 
basis of health, reasonable comfort and decency, but, as a matter of fact, are below 
the amount necessary to secure a bare subsistence, or, in other words, these earn- 
ings are not sufficient for the mine worker to satisfy the mere physical needs of 

limself and his family for food, shelter, heat and clothing. 

29 



COMPARISON OF EARNINGS AND WAGE RATES IN THE ANTHRACITE AND 
BITUMINOUS MINES OF PENNSYLVANIA. 

Analytically stated the comparative earnings and rates of pay in the bituminous 
and anthracite fields, have been, as follows: 

1. From 1903 to 1912 there was little difference in average yearly earnings between 
the anthracite and the bituminous fields of Pennsylvania. 

This is shown by figures furnished by the operators and published by the 
Pennsylvania State Department of Internal Affairs, a table and chart being 
printed in the exhibit. Some years one field showed higher earnings, and some 
years the other, but the maximum difference in any one year is in general 
10 per cent or less, there being one year, however, when anthracite earnings 
wers 21 per cent higher than bituminous, and one year when the anthracite 
earnings were 18 per cent lower. 

2. In recent years, on the other hand, bituminous earnings have averaged con- 
siderably higher than anthracite earnings. 

The figures from 1916 to 1918, inclusive, are from the files of the Pennsylvania 
Workmen's Compensation Commission, as reported by the Insurance Department 
and the Statistical Department of the Pennsylvania Compensation Rating and 
Inspection Bureau. The figures for 1919 are from a survey made by the 
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
The percentage excess of yearly bituminous earnings over anthracite earnings 
have been as follows: 

1916 16.8 per cent. 

1917 23.0 per cent. 

1918 40.9 per cent. 

1919 18.7 per cent. 

The reduction in 1919 of the difference between the two fields from 40.9 per 
cent to 18.7 per cent is caused by the adjustment of anthracite wage rates that 
took place in November, 1918, whereby the rates of contract miners were in- 
creased by 12 per cent, the day rates being increased $1.00 per day. It should be 
noted that the b'tuminous strike that took place in November and December, 
1919, is disregarded in the above computation, that is, the 1919 bituminous earn- 
ings are on the basis of 12 months operations. 

3. In 1920 the award of the President's Bituminous Coal Commission increased 
the bituminous earnings by an average of 27 per cent. 

The increase to day men and for yardage and dead work amounted to 
20 per cent, while the increase to the Pennsylvania pick miner was 27 per cent 
and to the machine miner was 34 per cent. 

4. In order to increase the present anthracite rates so that the earnings in the 
two fields may be once more about equal, it is now necessary to grant an increase 
to the anthracite mine workers amounting to an average of 50.74 per cent. 

This figure is the result of an increase of 18.7 per cent, necessary to place the 
anthracite worker where the bituminous worker stood in 1919, with a further 
increase of 27 per cent on top of that to balance the award of the President's 
Bituminous Coal Commission. 

5. Judging frcm the past, the opportunity to work that will be afforded the 
anthracite worker in the future will be lower than that afforded the bituminous 
worker in Pennsylvania. 

The average numbers of days worked in the two fields in Pennsylvania have 
been as follows: 

Per cent by which 
Days worked in Pennsylvania. anthracite days 



worked is lower 
Year. Anthracite. Bituminous. than bituminous 

1890-1892 200.3 226.0 13. per cent. 

1893-1897 181.4 194.2 7. per cent. 

1898-1902 160.6 238.8 49. per cent. 

1903-1907 207.2 229.6 11. per cent. 

1908-1913 232.6 238.2 3. per cent. 

1914-1918 261.2 245.8 

1919 (estimated) ... 252. 248.* 

On basis of 12 months operations, disregarding the strike. 

30 



With the coming of normal conditions, and a return to the anthracite mines 
of the normal number of employees, it is extremely probable that the days 
worked in the two fields will bear the same relation to each other as they did 
in the pre-war period, that is in all probability we may expect a greater 
opportunity to work in the bituminous than in the anthracite field by from 
3 to 11 per cent. 

6. Therefore it is reasonable to ask that the rates in the anthracite industry should 
be higher than the rates in the bituminous industry of Pennsylvania in order to 
make yearly earnings approximately equal. 

With an opportunity to work from 3 to 11 per cent lower, the rates should be 
proportionally higher. 

7. Formerly the rates were higher in the anthracite field than in the bituminous 
field. 

The average daily earnings of the two fields are published by the Pennsylvania 
Department of Internal Affairs. From 1903 to 1912 they were as follows: 

Per cent by which 
Anthracite earnings were 
Average daily earnings. higher than bituminous 



(a minus sign indicates 



Year. Anthacite. Bituminous. rate was lower) 

1903 $2.07 $2.31 —11.6 per cent. 

1904 2.48 2.26 8.9 per cent. 

1905 2.24 2.21 1.3 per cent. 

1906 2.39 2.66 —11.3 per cent. 

1907 2.36 . 2.25 4.7 per cent. 

1908 2.23 1.93 13.5 per cent. 

1909 2.34 2.00 14.5 per cent. 

1910 2.41 2.19 9.1 per cent. 

1911 2.46 2.35 4.5 per cent. 

1912 2.72 2.48 8.8 per cent. 

Simple average 4.24 per cent. 

Thus at the time when the days worked in the anthracite field averaged 
from 3 to 11 per cent lower than in the bituminous field (the average for the 
entire period being 6.4 per cent, the daily earnings of the anthracite mine 
worker averaged 4.24 per cent higher than the daily earnings of the bituminous 
worker, a fact that helped to equalize the yearly earnings between the two fields. 
8. At the present time the rates are higher in the bituminous than they are in the 
anthracite field. 

The anthracite day rates average about as follows: 

Inside mines: 

Semi-skilled $4.00 to $4.50 per day. 

Skilled 4.50 per day. 

Company miners 4.75 per day. 

Company miners' laborers 4.50 per day. 

Outside Mines: 

Common labor $3.31 per day. 

Semi-skilled 4.25 per day. 

Skilled 4.25 per day. 

By the award of the Bituminous Coal Commission the bituminous rates have 
been increased to a usual rate of $6.00 per day. 



STANDARDIZATION OF RATES OF PAY. 

About half the total employees of the anthracite industry are engaged in miscel- 
laneous occupations inside and outside the mines. These are blacksmiths, carpen- 
ters, trackmen, laborers, engineers, and the like. 

The rates of these men should be standardized. At present they vary from 
colliery to colliery, and men doing exact'y the same work, but employed at different 
collieries, are paid different rates. Standardization is a practicable, and even a 
simple matter, and should be done before the application of any wage increase. 

31 



The increases that these men have received since the adjustment of 1912 average 
about $2.00 per day for the inside workers and for the outside skilled workers, and 
about $1.85 per day for the outside unskilled workers. Thus the lower paid men 
received the smaller increase, measured in dollars. The lower paid men received, 
however, a higher per cent increase than did the higher paid men, averaging, 
indeed, a greater percentage increase than took place in the cost of living. 



THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WAGES AND PRODUCTION, COSTS, PRICES, 
AND PROFITS IN THE ANTHRACITE MINING INDUSTRY. 

Production and Days Worked. 

1. The production of anthracite coal is fairly constant. 

There has been little change in the amount of coal produced per year since 
1909, the maximum variation, except for the abnormal years 1917 and 1918, 
being about 12%. The production for 1919 was essentially the same as the 
average production for the period 1909-1919, still excluding the two abnormal 
years. There will be the normal increase in production caused by the growth of 
population, though this may be offset, at least in part, by bituminous competi- 
tion in the domestic market in the middle West and in the apartment house 
market in the East. But in general a production may be expected that will be 
fairly constant from year to year, especially in view of the fact that no anthracite 
is either imported or exported. 

2. The numbers of employees at the anthracite mines shows great fluctuation. 

At the start of the European war in 1914 there were about 180,000 anthracite 
employees. These began to drift away into the better paid industrial occu- 
pations or into the European forces, and when this country entered the war 
the number fell off still more so that by 1918 there were only 147,000 employed. 

3. The production during the abnormal years 1917-1918 increased at the very 
time when the numbers of employees were at a very low point. 

There has been little comparison between changes in production and changes 
in numbers of employees, the one frequently increasing when the other is 
decreasing and vice-versa. Thus in the ten years 1909-1919, there were five 
years in which the production and the number of employees showed opposite 
trends. 

4. The days worked varied inversely with the number of employees. 

In order to get out the required production, it has been necessary to increase 
the number of days worked when the number of employees fell, and decrease 
them as the number of employees rose. 

5. The production follows very closely the number of employee-days (that is the 
number of employees multiplied by the number of days worked). 

From 1909 on, as is shown by the exhibit, whenever the production rose or 
fell, the number of employees also rose or fell and did so at substantially the 
same rate as the change in the production. 

6. The fluctuation in the number of employees is one of the causes for the great 
irregularity of employment that exists in the anthracite industry. 

This fact is a corrollary of the points brought out above. It means that with 
a given desired production it is necessary to vary the number of days worked 
in accordance with the fluctuation in the number of employees, so that a varying 
number of employees means necessarily a varying opportunity for employment. 

7. The opportunity for employment that may be expected in the future will be 
substantially the same as that afforded during the pre-war years. 

Assuming, as it is safe to do, a fairly constant production each year, it fol- 
lows that the number of employee-days will also be fairly constant. This means 
that with a return of the normal working force of employees, the number of 
days worked will return to the pre-war rate. 

The industry during the last several years has been operating with a greatly 
reduced force of employees, and has, therefore, been obliged to operate its 
mines an unusual number of days per year in order to obtain the desird pro- 
duction. The indications are that the employees are already returning to their 
old jobs. In fact there were in 1919 about 5000 more than in 1918, though the 
number was still below the 1917 force. 

If the pre-war force of about 180,000 employees eventually returns, the num- 
ber of days worked per year will drop to about the same number that were 
worked during the pre-war period, that is to about 230. It is very likely, how- 
ever, that the average that may be expected will be nearer 240. 

32 



It is by no means safe, therefore, to base predictions as to future earning 
power upon the abnormally high number of days that the mines were worked 
in 1917, 1918 and even in 1919. On the contrary, the return of the employees 
to the industry will cut down the opportunity for employment, by decreasing 
the number of days worked and this will in turn cut down the earning power 
unless the wage rates are fixed with due regard for this factor, and are high 
enough to ensure suitable earnings with the reduced working time. 

Production and Wage Rates. 

8. The miners' wage rate has not kept pace with the value of his product. 

Since 1912 the value of the product per ton has increased up to 1919 a little 
over 102 per cent, while the wage rate of the contract miner has increased per 
ton 49.8 per cent, so in order to raise the present wage rate to the same propor- 
tional relationship to the value per ton it possessed in 1912 it would be neces- 
sary to increase it by 34.0 per cent. 

Using rates in round figures, a miner who in 1912 mined coal at the wage rate 
of 40 cents per ton, would produce for that wage coal at a value of $2,093. In 
1919 his wage rate would have become 60c, while his product would have a 
value of $4.20. Thus while he produced in 1912 coal worth 5^ times his wage 
rate, his product in 1919 would be worth 7 times his wage rate. 

Though it does not necessarily follow that his wage rate should keep pace 
with the value of his product, it is true that from 1912 to 1917 the two main- 
tained the same proportional relationship. 

Wage Rates axd Costs and Prices. 

9. The " margin " of sales realization over total mine cost has risen during the 
past several years. 

This is shown by the following table giving the margin for the combined 
fresh mined and washery product: 

Year. Margin. 

1913 $0.37 

1914 0.40 

1915 0.38 

1916 0.46 

1917 0.66 

1918 0.52 

10. Though the labor cost has also risen, the fact that the margin rose shows that 
the increase in labor costs has not been at the expense of the operators. 

11. The margin of sales realization over mine cost is comparatively conservative 
and moderate, but it does not by any means represent the total profit of the 
anthracite mining industry. 

This is partly on account of the method of marketing the coal through con- 
trolled coal sales corporations. 

There are seven anthracite coal companies whose financial reports are 
published in the standard financial manuals. All these corporations produce 
coal, but only two of them, the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Com- 
pany and the Temple Coal Company, also market the coal which they produce. 
The other five corporations market their entire product through separately 
incorporated selling agencies. This has a very important bearing upon the 
price of anthracite. 

The stock of these separate selling agencies is entirely owned by the railroad 
coal-producing companies, and detailed reports of their profits are seldom 
reported to the public. This method of maintaining separate producing and 
selling departments makes it possible effectually to conceal the actual profits 
realized. For the producing company sells coal to the sales department at 
such a price as to maintain only a fair margin, the bulk of the profit being 
taken by the sales company. 

Thus these figures do not get into the hands of any curious consumer who 
may wish to know why he pays $14.50 for a ton of coal that it costs only $4.50 
to produce. By this method also the operators are enabled to make two profits 
on each ton of coal, one for the producing company and one for the selling 
company, the capital stock of which represents absolutely no investment, 
usually being a stock dividend by the parent company. 

33 



This has made possible exorbitant profits even in pre-war years. This has 
made the price of anthracite always high. In fact, the profits were so high in 
pre-war years that the actual rise in war-times does not appear proportionally 
so great. 

Because of the selling device described above it is more difficult to show 
accurately the division of the purchase price with a view to determining the 
actual profit margin of the operators. However, when it is realized that the sell- 
ing companies are but another aspect of the operating corporations, it becomes 
possible to think of the wholesale price as the actual" sales realization of the 
operating corporation. The item sales realization then becomes merely an 
intra-corporation bookkeeping entry. 

12. War profits of a corporation marketing its own product. 

The income, account of the Philadelphia & Reading Company may be taken 
as indicative of the actual increase in profit during the Avar years, for it is the 
only concern publishing accounts for the entire period, which markets its own 
coal. It is interesting to observe that this company, which had no such selling 
device for concealing profits as that described above, was able to make a much 
smaller amount on each ton than did the other companies prior to the war, 
but that the war furnished it an opportunity to jump its profits into their class. 
The following table shows the earnings of the company for the years 1912-1918: 

Net 
Per cent on income 

Year. Net income. capital stock. per ton. 

1912 $171,576 2.1 $0,017 

1913 1,139,592 14.2 0.106 

1914 715,390 8.9 0.082 

1915 60,572 0.8 0.007 

1916 2,463,790 30.8 0.246 

1917 5,436,633 68.0 0.472 

1918 4,150,162 51.9 0.359 

The total tonnage produced by this company was only approximately 11 per 
cent greater for the war period than it was for the pre-war period, while the 
profit realized increased nearly 500 per cent. This finds its expression in an 
increase in the profit per ton of 435 per cent. 

The only other company reporting which markets its own product is the 
Temple Coal Company, and while the income of this corporation for 1918 was 
unobtainable, it is apparent that it realized a tremendous increase in profits 
during the war, its income in 1917 being nearly twice as great as the average 
income for the pre-war years. 

13. How excessive profits are concealed. 

The income figures discussed are the net profits available for paying dividends 
upon capital stock, after the deduction of every conceivable charge for deprecia- 
tion, depletion, sinking funds, and Federal income and excess profit taxes, as 
well as interest on indebtedness, local taxes and other items. 

The amounts deducted from gross income under the heading of depletion are 
almost always excessive and are the favorite form of " smoke screen " used by 
these corporations to conceal their profits. These charges are usually based 
upon the value of coal property, and when the accumulated " depletion reserve " 
approaches the total value of the coal land, a revaluation at a greatly advanced 
figure takes place. 

The Board of Directors of the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company reported 
to its stockholders in 1912 that a depletion charge of 5 cents per ton would pay 
for all of its coal land, the unworked as well as the exploited, in 20 years. The 
Federal Trade Commission in its report on anthracite coal production costs, 
1919, shows that the average charge for depletion made by eight railroad coal 
companies and eleven independent operators amounted to 17.4 cents per ton. 
Thus a profit of over 12 cents per ton is tucked away in depletion reserve and 
made the basis of a further issue of stocks or other securities in later years. 
This little hidden profit means $10,000,000 per year, equivalent to the average 
annual income for all the companies reported in the financial manuals com- 
bined for the pre-war years. It would mean a hidden profit to these companies 
themselves of $5,000,000 per year or one-half their pre-war profits. In the 
future this will be given capital value which will enable the corporations to 
increase their profits without seeming to increase the rate of return upon 
capital stock. 

24 



14. Why the coal sales companies are profitable. 

Since 1911 the Lehigh Valley Coal Sales Company has been the selling agent 
for all the coal produced by the Lehigh Valley Coal Company, which is, in its 
turn, owned by the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company. The stock of the sales 
company was sold to the stockholders of the railroad company, the railroad 
declaring a special dividend which paid for the stock. In other words, the 
stockholders paid nothing for the stock, but received it as a gift out of the 
excess profits of the railroad. The sales company has earned huge profits, 
having declared two 25 per cent stock dividends, and paid since 1917 4 per cent 
quarterly not to mention a 30 per cent special dividend with the option of 
buying more stock and a 10 per cent dividend in Liberty Bonds. 

The coal sales department of the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Rail- 
road Company was organized along the same lines, the entire stock being paid 
for by a special 50 per cent dividend from the railroad. Within three years 
its net earnings had equalled the entire value of the capital stock, which had 
cost the stockholders nothing. 

Such facts as these serve to show not only what quantities of the country's 
money is going to pay high profits to people who never invested a single cent, 
but also the way in which excessive railroad earnings were diverted into profit 
making enterprises of a different sort. 

15. Another reason why the margins of the coal mining operations are so reason- 
able is found in the fact that the railroads depend upon the freight rates for a con- 
siderable portion of their profits. 

A letter written by Mr. T. P. Fowler, of the Ontario Railroad, to Mr. George 
F. Baer, of the Reading, in 1906, relative to his (Mr. Fowler's) proposal to 
reduce freight rates, not in order to reduce the price of coal but to increase the 
margin of the coal companies, contained in part this statement: 

" It is my firm belief that the present wholesale price of coal is as low as it 
is possible to make it, having regard to the cost of production and the capital 
invested. I do not intend that it shall be lowered, if I can prevent it, and there 
is no reason why anyone else should do so, or threaten to do it, but I am con- 
vinced that the division of the market price between the producer and the 
transporter, as expressed in tariffs, needs readjustment at once. I use the term 
' division,' because the business since its inception has been conducted on the 
basis of percentages (i. e., division) and that fact is universally known and has 
been admitted by both sides in every controversy over rates." 

The point to bear in mind is that there is one ownership of the coal mines, 
the coal sales companies, and the railroads, and the total profit to that common 
owner resultnig from all three branches of the industry should be considered 
as a unit, and not simply the profit from one branch which admittedly is on a 
conservative basis. 

16. The increase in labor costs at the mines is not the prime cause for the great 
increase that has taken place in retail prices to the consumer. 

The table below gives the increases per gross ton that have taken place up 
to December, 1918, in the mine costs and retail prices: 

Ii-.crease in Hollars per Increase in dollars per 
frr^sston. Average of gross ton. Average of 
1914 to average of 1918. 1914 to December 1918. 

Labor cost $0.85 $1.41 

Total FOB Mine Cost 1.31 2.05 

Sales Realization 1.43 2.22 

Wholesale price FOB Mine 1.69 2.69 

Retail price — Scranton 3.332* 

Retail price— New York 4.368* 

Retail price — Boston 4.48* 

Thus it is evident that the increase in dollars per gross ton of labor costs at 
the mine is materially less than the increase in the other costs and prices listed 
in the table. For instance, the consumer in New York or Boston was paying for 
his coal in January, 1919, as compared with what he paid in January, 1914, an 
increase in dollars per ton over three times the increase that was given to the 
labor at the mines. 

Since January, 1919, and up to June, 1920, the retail price per gross ton in 
New York and Boston, has increased an average of about $2.40. A good part of 
this increase was evidently made in anticipation of the award of the Anthracite 

* Increase from January, 1914, to January, 1919. 

35 



Coal Commission, which by agreement will be retroactive to April 1st, 1920, and 
if this increase in retail prices proves to be three times the increase in labor 
costs at the mines, as was the case above, it means that the coal trade expects 
an award that will increase the labor costs $0.80 per ton, which is an increase 
of 27 per cent over the labor cost of December, 1918. 
17. The labor cost at the mine forms only a small part of the total retail cost to 
the consumer. . 

In January, 1919, the labor cost at the mines formed only a little less than 
one-quarter of the total retail price of domestic coal in New York City. An 
increase in the wage rates, therefore, that would add 50 per cent to the labor 
cost of mining coal would increase the retail price by only 12% per cent, if the 
other costs and the profits were maintained as before. 



LABOR AND THE GENERAL INCREASE IN THE COST OF LIVING. 

From the exhibits which we have submitted in this connection it is made clear 
that advances in rates of pay to anthracite workers have not been financially 
responsible for the increased prices of coal. Wage advances have, as a matter 
of fact, been used as a pretext for unjustifiable advances in prices all along the lines 
of distribution. Likewise, so far as the products of the basic industries are con- 
cerned, the same conditions are true. Since the armistice, practically all demands 
for advances in rates of pay by industrial workers have been met by the claim 
that to increase wage rates would be to take "another step in the vicious circle 
of increased living cost." Labor, in general, by deliberate propaganda has been 
represented as the profiteer. The railroad labor organizations in their recent 
case before the Railway Wage Board, as the result of large expense and expert 
effort, effectually refuted these misrepresentations, and conclusively proved that 
increased prices were not due to increased labor costs, and also that while labor's 
status was impaired during the war, the natural emergency was seized upon by 
capital for the exacture of exorbitant and indefensible profits. We have secured 
and submitted for the information of the Board the series of studies or exhibits 
prepared for the Railway Board relative to Wages, Profits, and Prices, in order that 
it may be clearly seen that labor not only in the anthracite but in all industries 
has been misrepresented, and that a large proportion of the present excessive prices 
charged for coal and other essential commodities arises from unconscionable 
profiteering by capital and not from advances in rates of pay to anthracite and 
other workers. 



WAGES AND WHOLESALE AND RETAIL PRICES. 

Wholesale prices have increased less, in terms of per cent during the war, than 
labor costs, and more than have the rates of contract miners. The significant fact 
is, however, that measured in actual dollars per ton, wholesale prices of anthracite 
coal have increased from 1914 to 1918 practically twice as much as have labor costs. 
Since 1918 there have been further advances. The New York wholesale price of 
stove coal in 1914 was only $3.60 a ton; in 1918, $5.29; in 1919, $6:54, and in 1920 
(six months), $7.09, an average increase over the 1918 price of $1.80 per ton. 

The advance in retail prices has been even much greater than in wholesale prices. 
As regards the consumer in New York and Boston, the increase that he has been 
required to pay for his coal is over three times as great, in terms of dollars and 
cents per ton, than the increase given to the labor at the mines. Labor costs at the 
mines advanced 85 cents per ton during the period 1914-1918, while during the same 
years the increase in the retail price of the coal in New York was $4.36 per ton 
and in Boston $4.48 per ton. 

Since November, 1918, there have been no advances in the wage scales, and pre- 
sumably the labor costs at the mines have kept fairly close to the mark of November- 
December, 1918. The retail price, for stove coal in New York since the beginning of 
1919, has increased $1.89 per ton, and in Boston, $2.50. These large advances cannot 
in any way be attributed to advances in rates of pay to anthracite miners. 

36 



SIGNIFICANCE OF COMBINATION IN THE ANTHRACIT^E INDUSTRY. 
Claim to Small Peofits Equivocal. 

There id one point which we wish to make so clearly that there shall be no fur- 
ther doubt in the matter. For it is a point vital to the entire settlement of the 
controversy. We contend that there is no warrant for the assertion that the Anthra- 
cite Industry cannot pay higher wages without a further increase in the prices 
charged to the consumer. Such an assertion is based upon the meagreness of pres- 
ent returns earned by the great anthracite companies. Any attempt to argue from 
such a standpoint is, in fact, the most unprincipled equivocation. 

We contend that the anthracite industry is paying profits which are amply ade- 
quate to absorb the cost of a just increase in wages. And we base our contention 
upon a thorough analysis of the internal organization and structure of the indus- 
try. Enough money is abstracted between the time when the coal leaves the pro- 
ducing agency and the time when it reaches the local dealer to pay the requested 
wage increase and at the same time to reduce the price of anthracite to the con- 
sumer. This money which is abstracted actually goes to the same interests that 
will here tell a pitiful story of the small profits which they are deriving from the 
anthracite companies. In short, the anthracite companies which they represent will 
be found to be nothing more than separate producing departments of a much larger 
business organization whose profits it will be well to look into. 

Relevance of the Question of Combination. 

The method and structure of combination in the anthracite industry is a matter 
relevant and vital to this present controversy. Thorough investigation of this 
monopoly will reveal funds which do actually exist but which are illegitimately 
withheld from the worker in wages and taken from the consumer in unwarranted 
prices. And we urge upon this Commission the importance of tracing these illegiti- 
mate profits to the place of concealment as a basis for awarding a just wage, as well 
as in explaining it to the public. 

We are not contending that the anthracite coal companies are making undue 
profits. As we have shown in an extensive exhibit, the majority of them have 
rarely if ever paid a dividend — many of them actually having operated at a loss. 
But we do contend that the motive underlying this foregoing of profits and taking 
of losses has not been one of pure philanthropic public service. 

Thorough-going Investigation Needed. 

The anthracite industry has been organized into a huge combination, a monopoly 
very similar in structure to an Octopus. Its head and body are a very small group 
of banking interests. Its entwining arms are seven railway systems which control 
at their extremities the anthracite mining operations of the country. 

As a result of this fact we are willing to go further than the assertion that the 
anthracite companies are making very meagre profits. One might as well speak of 
the profits of a grocer's storehouse from which he brings the goods which he sells. 
The anthracite industry is one great combination composed of seven great business 
organizations. No one can judge of its profits in terms of departmental book- 
keeping. 

The books of the entire concern, of the industry from mine via railroad to final 
disposal by the sales corporation, must be examined before any one can say just 
what are the profits derived from anthracite. Until such an investigation is made 
no one will be in a position to say just how much of the price represents legitimate 
cost, just how much leeway there is above this which will permit the grant of a 
just wage rate. 

Importance of Such Investigation of the Books. 

Our contention is that such an examination of the books of the anthracite coal 
combination is essential to the settlement of this controversy on the basis of justice. 
The main issue will be found to be involved in this point of view. And we are 
willing to stand or fall on the basis of the results which will follow from such an 
investigation of the actual cost of anthracite in terms of fairly determined mine 
cost plus fairly determined transportation cost plus fairly determined selling ex- 
pense. But we require an investigation which questions the validity of every charge 
for much of the illegitimate profit of the industry is concealed under illegitimate 
charges which enter into the cost side of the ledger. 

37 



Facts Demonstrated by Our Investigation. 

■ 

Our investigation, printed copies of which are already in your hands, demon- 
strates the true nature of the problem. It demonstrates that the entire anthracite 
industry is dominated by hanking interests and that huge and illegitimate profits 
have resulted from a deliberate attempt to justify low wages and high profits. Step 
by step on the basis of concrete evidence that investigation shows the following 
facts. 

(1) The anthracite industry is today organized into seven great railway systems, 
each of which controls the production, transportation and sale to local dealers of 
its quota of the total anthracite annually consumed. 

(2) Before the end of the 19th century the railroad companies, either operating 
directly or through their coal companies, had come into the ownership of over 90 
per cent of the unmined coal. If we add the amount controlled through contract 
the percentage of unmined coal free from the control of the railroad companies 
amounted to less than 4 per cent. 

(3) Almost without exception the important anthracite companies in the field 
to-day are the creatures of these railroad companies, having either been created by 
them or acquired through stock purchase. They are really simply separately incor- 
porated coal departments of these anthracite roads. The fact that these two 
branches of the industry, mining and transportation, really form a single business 
is demonstrated by inter-stock ownership, by interlocking directorates, and by the 
unanimity shown in the determination of policy. 

(4) As a matter of fact the bookkeeping evidences of the unity between the rail- 
roads and their coal companies are overwhelming. The railroads established such 
high rates for the transportation of anthracite that it became impossible for a coal 
company to operate at a profit. The railroad coal companies were then supported 
by subsidies granted in one form or another by the parent railroad company. This 
was made possible by a bookkeeping system which rendered the finances of the two 
companies practically one. The railroads have carried bonds, made good losses, 
granted working capital, and in other ways assisted the coal companies financially, 
charging either a low rate of interest or none at all. 

(5) This has involved the treatment of profit policy from a single standpoint. 
The railroad coal companies have practically without exception failed to make a 
profit. This has been the result of deliberate policy on the part of those who con- 
trol the entire system. It could have been modified. It could be today so arranged 
that the anthracite companies would show a profit. But this does not fit in with 
the self interest of those who control the situation. The profits of the industry 
have appeared almost altogether in the dividends, reserves and bond interest of 
the seven anthracite railroads — recently also in the dividends of certain sales com- 
panies whose stock is owned by the stockholders of the railroads. 

(6) Legitimate costs and profits in the anthracite industry have been inflated 
through the over-capitalization policy which seems to characterize the organiza- 
tions and reorganizations of industry in which the banking group have a hand. 
This is so important a phase of the matter that I am going to bring several aspects 
of it to your attention. For every step in the process of monopolization has con- 
tributed its share to the present condition of the industry which affords an apparent 
basis for the vicious argument that despite high prices the companies are unable 
to pay the mine-workers a living wage. 

The first fact which I wish to call to your attention is that in the rush to monopo- 
lize anthracite reserves the railroad companies bought thousands of acres of un- 
productive land. To the extent that a so-called just return on such investment is 
making it impossible for the companies to lower prices or pay decent wages, to just 
that extent are the consumer and the mine-worker being asked to pay a return on 
the mistakes made by men in their rush after profit. Much of the land bought will 
not be used for many years. Yet legitimate profits are asked on such investment. 
This means simply that a profit is being asked upon money invested in order to 
prevent others from getting a chance to mine anthracite. Such profits are an 
illegitimate drain upon the money which should go to establishing just wages. 

Again we find that the rush to monopolize the reserves of anthracite caused the 
value of such coal lands to be highly inflated. Land bought in at enormous prices 
was further inflated whenever it became necessary to find physical assets to back 
inflated capitalization. 

Cash resources were not available to enable these companies to make such enor- 
mous purchases. This forced them to pursue a policy of mortgaging the stocks and 
physical assets of their various purchases. Thus the process of securing a monopoly 
of anthracite saddled the anthracite railroads with enormous bonded debts, the 

38 



interest charges on which have entered regularly and still enter into the apparent 
cost of transporting the coal to its destination. This is really an inflation of the 
cost of transportation. It amounts to an additional profit taken in the course of 
transporting anthracite to the consumer. And this charge was increased beyond 
any excusable limit by the " watering " of the stock issues in the course of organi- 
zation and reorganization. 

This fact is exceedingly important. For in it is concealed the basis upon which 
the anthracite combination justifies high prices and low wages. It is really the 
channel through which the cost of financial juggling and unwisdom is passed on to 
the consumer. It also serves to block requests for adequate wages. 

(7) This brings us to a very important conclusion which should influence the 
board in its proceedings. The profits of the anthracite industry are to be found 
in the profits of the anthracite railroads and in the profits of the sales companies 
controlled by their stockholders. To these must be added the millions of dollars 
which go each year to those who hold the tens of millions of dollars of bonded 
indebtedness which have resulted from the financing of the industry. 

The point which we wish to make is that a well-defined process exists by which 
the profits of the anthracite industry are successfully concealed, the high prices 
being explained by apparent high costs. The losses of the railroad coal companies 
are written into the cost of transportation through advances without interest and 
through the funding operations which impose large fixed charges upon the rail- 
road department. The high freight rates which such inflated transportation costs 
seem to justify are written into the cost of anthracite and serve to bridge the gap 
between the mine cost and the high prices which prevail. 

In general this financial policy has proved of value to those who dominate the 
industry in the following ways: 

It has furnished a basis for heavily "watering" the capitalization of the various 
parts of the industry. 

It has furnished large returns as interest on bonded indebtedness. 

But especially it serves to blind the public which is vainly trying to find the 
cause of high prices. As we have already explained the real profits of the anthra- 
cite industry are thus piped off below the surface in terms which the public does 
not associate with the problem of anthracite. We might here call attention to the 
fact that while the margin shown by the production companies for the year 1918 
if reckoned on 90,000.000 tons would show a profit to the coal companies of some- 
thing over $30,000,000, the profits which the anthracite railroads made out of the 
transportation of the commodity when added to the charges attributable to funded 
debts, etc., and to the profits of the railroad sales organizations would probably 
be found to total nearly seven times that amount. These are the profits which are 
large enough to absorb the increases which the anthracite workers are requesting. 

And it is just the fact that the policy of diverting the profits of anthracite while 
it is in transit serves as a means to blocking the request for wage increases that 
makes it of especial service to the anthracite roads. For it makes possible the 
claim that the industry cannot pay wage advances. In other words, the system 
presses up to squeeze the consumer and down to squeeze the wage earner, by divert- 
ing profits at a point where neither can see them through the screen of bookkeeping 
and legal devices. 

This is the point which we wish to make. Anthracite is an extremely profitable 
business, but the profits are taken in the transportation and sales end of the busi- 
ness. The rates of transporting anthracite are such that the net income per ton 
carried is considerably higher than that for any other class of freight, while the 
anthracite roads, thanks to the financial manipulation just described, are able to 
justify these rates on the basis of apparent costs. The conclusion is inevitable, 
therefore, that the anthracite combination has chosen the transportation depart- 
ment as the strategic point at which profits may be most unobtrusively drawn off. 
The chief profits have been abstracted through the railroads as a channel. 

In other words the division of the price of anthracite between wages, other costs, 
and return to capital is not what it appears to be as the result of a mere study of 
the accounts of the producing corporations. In determining this division profit 
must be considered in terms of the entire return to legitimate investment in all 
departments. This will include profits of the anthracite roads on the transporta- 
tion of anthracite, fixed charges entering into the cost of anthracite as a result of 
the policy involved in the buying and control of coal companies, and the profits of 
the railroad coal sales companies. 

39 



Profits Prom All Departments go to Same Group. 

If the anthracite companies set up the legal fiction that they are really indepen- 
dent, basing their contention upon the fact that they are separately incorporated; 
and furthermore, if they set up the contention that the fixed charges really repre- 
sent interest owed to other interests; then we believe that every administrative 
body in either national or state governments, that every official charged with the 
administration of law and justice, that every legislative body should take steps to 
eliminate this basis for deception. The anthracite system is knit into a single 
great monopoly by inter-stock ownership, by interlocking directorates, by informal 
conferences, and especially by the engrossing control of the great New York bank- 
ing combine headed by J. P. Morgan & Co. Four members of the inner circle domi- 
nate through directorships companies shipping over 75 per cent of the total anthra- 
cite tonnage. This means a close community of financial interest. It means that 
declarations of separateness are mere fictions. It means that, by and large, all the 
profits and interest charges flow into the same great profit reservoirs which can and 
should be drawn upon to afford the workers in the industry a living wage. 



EARNINGS OF ANTHRACITE RAILROADS. 

In order fully to disclose the extent of the profiteering which has characterized 
the Anthracite industry, the earnings of the Anthracite railroads, as well as the 
profits of their subsidiary mining companies, must be considered. The practical 
identity of the Anthracite carriers and the mining companies has resulted in huge 
profits being taken both in the production and in the distribution of Anthracite. 
In either case the profits go eventually into the coffers of the railroads. The facts 
may be summarized as follows: 

(1) The Anthracite railroad coal companies control 80 per cent of the com- 
mercial production of coal and are in turn controlled by the eight important 
Anthracite-carrying railroads. 

(2) The freight charges for the transportation of Anthracite are from 
2y 2 to 3 times the operating cost of transportation and are highly remunerative. 
They comprise from 6 per cent to 60 per cent of the total freight revenues of 
the Anthracite carriers. They have made possible the payment of immense 
dividends. 

(3) During the 10 years, 1909-1918, the Reading company has paid in divi- 
dends on its common stock an average rate of 6.7 per cent; the Central of 
New Jersey, 11.6 per cent; the Lehigh Valley, 9 per cent; the Lackawanna, 
20.3 per cent; the Delaware and Hudson, 9 per cent; the Pennsylvania Railroad 
Company, 6 per cent; the New York, Ontario and Western, 1.1 per cent, and 
the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, 8 per cent. 

(4) The return to the stockholders of the Anthracite railroads in accumulated 
surplus amounted on December 31, 1918, for the Reading Co. to $33,000,000, or 
23 per cent on its capital stock; Central of New Jersey, $47,000,000, or 170 per 
cent; Lehigh Valley, $24,000,000, or 40 per cent; Lackawanna, $57,000,000, 
or 135 per cent; Delaware and Hudson, $30,000,000, or 70 per cent; Pennsyl- 
vania, $275,000,000, or 54 per cent; Erie, $52,000,000, or 30 per cent; New York, 
Ontario and Western, $7,000,000, or 12 per cent; Lehigh Coal and Navigation 
Company, $17,000,000, or 54 per cent. 

(5) The actual earnings of the Anthracite carriers on their capital stock 
outstanding during the period 1913-1918 in the case of the Lackawanna varied 
from 24 per cent to 36 per cent, and in the case of the Lehigh Valley ranged as 
high as 29 per cent, and for the Central of New Jersey up to 27 per cent. 



FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF ANTHRACITE RAILROADS. 

An examination of the financial history of the Anthracite Railroads, as shown by 
our restricted data, indicates that seven of these companies have issued, in round 
numbers, not less than $500,000,000 in fictitious or unnecessary securities and as a 
result of their financial excesses are disbursing annually in interest and dividends 
approximately $20,000,000. Considered by companies the principal events in the 
financial mismanagement of tliese railroads have been as follows: 

Reading Company. The over-capitalization of the Reading Company may con- 
servatively be placed at $113,000,000. This is the amount of water injected into the 

40 



capitalization of its subsidiaries, the Philadelphia & Reading Ry Co., and the Phila- 
delphia & Reading Coal and Iron Co., as shown by a comparison of the par value 
and market value of the securities issued at their reorganization in 1896. In order 
to support this capitalization, the Reading Company which acquired the capital 
stock of these companies created fictitious values by capitalizing as assets on its 
balance sheet, $67,000,000 in liabilities of the Philadelphia & Reading Coal and Iron 
Co., which were discharged by the reorganization, by placing a fictitious value on 
$20,000,000 in mortgage bonds issued by the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Co., 
without consideration, and by other methods. A total of $1,848,750 in unnecessary 
securities was also issued by the Reading Company in the acquisition of a majority 
interest in the capital stock of the Central Railroad of New Jersey at a price in 
excess of its market value. 

It is unnecessary to go into all the details of the past financial history of the 
Reading Company but the facts conclusively show as pointed out above that not less 
than $113,000,000 of its capital stock is water. The dividends disbursed by the 
Reading Company on this fictitious capitalization in 1918 amounted to $7,320,000 
and during the last ten years alone have aggregated more than $60,000,000. 

The Lehigh Valley Railroad. In the flotation of securities at prices below their 
market value the Lehigh Valley Railroad has issued for underwriting fees and in 
stock bonuses since 1900, securities of the total par value of $6,802,805 and has put 
out $5,755,639 in unnecessary capitalization, imposing an annual charge upon the 
company for interest and dividends upon these unnecessary securities of $475,000. 
In addition to this dissipation of its resources an extra dividend of 10 per cent of 
$6,068,000 disbursed to the stockholders of the railroad in 1911 to enable them to 
purchase stock in the Lehigh Valley Coal Sales Company represents an annual 
loss to the railroad of approximately $303,400. A total of $10,199,700 was also 
wasted in the purchase of securities of the Delaware, Susquehanna and Schuylkill 
Railroad Co., and Coxe Brothers & Company, Incorporated, in 1906 at an excessive 
price imposing an annual interest charge upon the railroad of $407,998. Certain 
coal company investments of the Lehigh Valley Railroad, have caused it a further 
loss since 1906 of $527,000 annually and it has disbursed on account of its lease of 
the Morris Canal and Banking Company, approximately $12,000,000, which is not 
shown to be represented by any material addition of the earning power or assets of 
the company. Since 1911 also the Lehigh Valley has loaned $10,537,000 without 
interest to the Lehigh Valley Coal Sales Company. The annual loss to the Company 
from this transaction is approximately $526,850. 

Irrespective of the losses sustained through the operation and maintenance of the 
Morris Canal and Banking Company, investments in coal lands, and the gratis loan 
to the coal sales company, it is seen that the Lehigh Valey Railroad, since 1900, 
in excessive underwriting fees and unnecssary issuance of securities has added 
$11,968,232, to its bonded debt, entailing an annual interest charge of $483,406, and 
has issued $4,000,000 in capital stock for which it received nothing, on which the 
dividend payments amount to $400,000 annually. 

In other words, since 1900, the railroad has incurred unnecessary yearly obliga- 
tion of nearly $900,000, for which it received nothing in return. Including the 
transactions in connection with the Coal Sales Company, the annual loss to the 
railroad through financial mismanagement is $1,713,248. 

The Delaware, Lackaivanna & Western R. R. Co. — During the last 60 years the 
stockholders of this company have received in cash dividends the enormous sum of 
$133,000,000. In addition the company has declared capital stock dividends of 
129 per cent and has donated in subscription rights to its stockholders $36,000,000. 
It has also paid to its stockholders an aggregate of 53 per cent in dividends in the 
stock of the Warren Railroad Company, the Morris & Essex Railroad Co., and the 
Lackawanna Railroad. 

In 1909 a total of $9,000,000 in unnecessary obligations was added to the com- 
pany's capitalization by the sale of capital stock to the stockholders at par when 
the market price was 400 per cent of par. Including a capital stock dividend of 
15 per cent declared in 1909, this is a total of $13,077,000 in unnecessary securities 
added to the capital liabilities of the company in ten years. The dividend dis- 
bursements on these obligations in 1918 amounted to $2,615,400 and since 1909 have 
aggregated $17,807,850. 

In 1909 the company's stockholders were paid a dividend of 37% per cent 
or $6,800,000 to be used in subscribing to the capital stock of the Delaware, Lacka- 
wanna & Western Coal Sales Company at par. This company was organized by 
the officers and directors of the Railroad Company for no other purpose apparently 
but to conceal the profits made by the latter company in the production of hard 
coal. Computed at the rate of 5 per cent, the annual interest on this unnecessary 

41 



disbursement of $6,800,000 would be $340,000. Thus a total of $2,915,400 annually 
has been lost to the company through financial mismanagement since 1913 alone. 

The Delaware & Hudson. During the ten-year period 1901-1909, the Delaware & 
Hudson issued for cash securities to the par value of $103,408,000. The market 
value of these securities based on contemporaneous quotations was $115,387,441, but 
the railroad received from their sale only $104,705,082. In other words, $10,682,359 
was paid for commissions and underwriting fees for floating these securities. 
Computing interest at the rate of 5 per cent, this excess issue of securities repre- 
sents an annual drain upon the resources of the Delaware and Hudson of $534,118, 
or a total disbursement during the ten-year period, 1910-1919, alone of more than 
$5,000,000. 

The Pennsylvania Railroad. In the flotation of securities at less than their 
market value, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company during the ten years 1901-1909 
dissipated its resources to the extent of $131,754,921. The total par value of the 
securities issued for cash by the Pennsylvania during this period was $1,054,310,374 
and the cash proceeds to the railroad $1,082,857,661. As a consequence the rail- 
road, by the payment of underwriting fees, by granting bonuses to stockholders or 
permitting them to subscribe at a quotation less than the market value, or for 
other reasons, received, as pointed cut above, $131,754,921 less than it would have 
obtained if it had offered these securities for sale in the open market. By its 
financial practices the use of this enormous amount of capital was lost. The income 
from this sum at 5 per cent per annum would be $6,587,746, which is a conservative 
estimate of what an equivalent amount of new capital would have cost the company 
and indicates the magnitude of the burden which it has incurred through financial 
mismanagement. 

New York, Ontario & Western. In view of the great disparity between the net 
capitalization of the New York, Ontario and Western and other railroads when 
reduced to a mileage basis, it is evident that the former company is grossly over- 
capitalized. Reduced to a mileage basis, for example, the average net capitalization 
for the 569 miles of road operated by the Company in 1918 was $139,058 per mile. 

Computed on the same basis the average net capitalization per mile of road for the 
railroads of the country as a whole, as of December 31, 1916, is only $66,356. For 
other railroads in the same territory the figures range from $12,000 to $94,000 per 
mile. 

It would seem conservative therefore, to assume that only about $45,000,000 of 
the company's capital liabilities represent actual investment as its capitalization 
on this basis amounts to approximately $65,000 per mile which conforms very closely 
to the average for the railroads of the country as a whole. If the securities which are 
clearly fictitious be allocated to the capital stock of the company the balance remain- 
ing which may be taken as actual investment is only $13,747,941. 

The Erie Railroad Co. From 1866 to 1874 the Erie Railroad was exploited by 
successive groups of financial adventurers who dissipated its resources and burdened 
the company with an enormous amount of fictitious capitalization. Under the Drew- 
Gould-Watson regime, which culminated with the bankruptcy of the company in 
1874, its treasury was systematically looted, and fictitious stocks and bonds to the 
par value of $87,000,000 were added to its securities without consideration. The 
company is now paying the penalty in the form of an enormous load of over- 
capitalization for the financial misdeeds of these early adventurers who left little 
to the imagination as to methods of plundering a railroad. 

During a more recent period in the company's history its resources were further 
dissipated by the payment of commissions and underwriting fees to financial 
syndicates to the extent of nearly $7,000,000. In the acquisition of the Pennsyl- 
vania Coal Company in 1902, the Erie Railroad through the domination of a group of 
bankers, was compelled to issue securities of the par value of $37,000,000. The 
banking syndicate which purchased these securities was able to dispose of them at 
a profit of $4,480,000. The loss to the company in annual interest charges from this 
transaction alone is $120,000. 

In the payment of commissions and underwriting fees to bankers on securities 
sold for cash during the period 1900-1910, the Erie also issued unnecessary bonds and 
notes to the par value of $2,437,466, involving a further loss in interest charges of 
$121,873 per year. Thus the annual loss to the company through financial mismanage- 
ment during the period 1900-1910 alone is more than $240,000. 

A comparison on a mileage basis of the capitalization of the Erie company with 
other railroads in the same territory and for the country as a whole shows that 
the Erie is overcapitalized to the extent of $165,000,000. In other words the capital 
stock of the company with the exception of about $12,000,000 preferred stock, is 
purely fictitious and should be eliminated from consideration in any study of the 

42 



financial position of the company and its ability to pay increased wages to its 

employees. 

* * * * 

A computation as to the rate of return on that proportion of the capital stock of the 
anthracite railroads which represents actual investment, as indicated by the above 
data, shows that the net return on such capitalization during the period 1913-1918 
varied in the case of the Reading from 32 per cent to 40 per cent; for the Lehigh 
Valley, from 15 per cent to 20 per cent; for the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western, 
from 35 per cent -to 61 per cent; for the Delaware & Hudson, from 13 per cent to 
22 per cent; for the Pennsylvania, from 9 per cent to 14 per cent; for the Erie, from 
8 per cent to 87 per cent; and for the New York, Ontario and Western, from 4 per 
cent to 9 per cent. 

PROFITS OF ANTHRACITE OPERATORS. 

A survey of the Anthracite Industry shows an increase in net profits of the prin- 
cipal operators for the period 1916-1918 over 1912-1914 of nearly 90 per cent as com- 
pared with an increase in production during this period of less than 12 per cent. For 
the year 1919 the available figures show for two representative companies an increase 
in net profits over 1918 of 18 per cent. The figures quoted are exclusive of the profits of 
the separately incorporated selling companies through which certain of the principal 
operators market their product. These companies, since their organization, have 
paid annual dividends ranging from 20 per cent to 30 per cent. 

In the case of seven representative mining companies there was an increase in net 
income per ton during the period 1916-1918 over 1912-1914 of 69.7 per cent. Expressed 
in terms of dollars the total net income of these companies advanced from an 
aggregate of $29,354,989 for the period 1912-1914 to $55,528,849 for the period 1916- 
1918, an increase of $26,173,860 or 89.2 per cent. In other words, their average 
annual profits during the war were nearly double their yearly profits for the pre-war 
period though their total production increased only 11.6 per cent. The net income 
earned by these companies on their capital stock outstanding during the period 
1916-1918 ranged from 20.4 per cent to 36.6 per cent, as compared with a net income 
in 1912-1914 ranging from 14.2 per cent to 18.9 per cent. Their combined aggregate 
output during the seven years ending December 31, 1918, it should be noted, was 
approximately 325,000,000 tons or about 56 per cent of all tonnage produced during 
that period. 

The immense profits reported by three of the principal mining companies for 
1916-1918 are exclusive of the earnings of their separately incorporated selling 
departments and represent only a fraction of their actual profits. Since its organiza- 
tion in 1910 the Lehigh Valley Coal Sales Company, for example, has paid annual 
dividends at an average rate of nearly 20 per cent. The Delaware, Lackawanna and 
Western Coal Company since its organization in 1909 has paid 300 per cent in 
dividends and has accumulated a surplus of $5,973,595 or more than 90 per cent of its 
capital stock outstanding. The capital stock of these companies, it is interesting 
to note, was paid for out of dividends declared for that purpose by the Anthracite 
mining companies. 

The actual increase in profits during the war years of the coal companies which 
market their own product is indicated by the income account of the Philadelphia 
and Reading Company. This company, which had no selling device for concealing 
its profits, increased its production only 11 per cent during the war years but 
increased its profits nearly 500 per cent and its profits per ton of output 435 per cent. 
The Temple Coal Comany which also markets its own product, reported net profits 
in 1917 of $1,691,324 an increase as compared with its average yearly profits for 
the period 1912-1914 of more than 80 per cent. A combined statement for the 
Lehigh Valley Coal and Navigation Company, the Lehigh and Wilkesbarre Coal 
Company, the Lehigh Valley Company and the Philadelphia and Reading Company 
shows that the average annual net income of these companies advanced from 
$6,923,595 in 1912-1914 to $13,135,932 in 1916-1918, an increase of $6,172,337 or 89 per 
cent. Six smaller companies whose income tax returns were published at the 
request of the United States Senate show an increase in net profits in 1917 over 1916 
of $509,004, or nearly 90 per cent. 

The available figures for 1919 indicate even larger profits for this period than 
the earnings reported for 1918. The Coal department of the Delaware, and Hudson, 
for example, shows an increase in net profits in 1919 over 1918 of $707,252 or 
43.9 per cent. The Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company reported an increase in net 
profits in 1919 of $69,794 or 2.5 per cent. For the two companies combined there 
was an increase in net profits in 1919 over 1918 of $777,046, or 17.6 per cent. 

43 



FREIGHT RATES ON ANTHRACITE COAL, 1914-1920. 

The rates shown are taken from the published commodity tariffs of the following 
anthracite railroads, the tariff numbers being printed in the exhibit: 

Pennsylvania R. R. 

Central R. R. of N. J. 

Delaware, Lackawanna & Western. 

Philadelphia & Reading. 

Lehigh Valley. 

Delaware and Hudson. 

Erie Railroad. 

Lehigh & New England. 

New York, Ontaria & Western. 
The tables present rates on each of these roads, where obtainable, to the cities in 
which retail prices were secured (except Scranton), per ton of 2240 pounds from 
points in the anthracite regions. To Baltimore, Washington, Boston, Providence and 
Bridgeport the rates on prepared sizes via the several lines are almost exactly 
uniform, with slight variations on pea and smaller sizes. The prevailing rates to 
these cities are as follows: 

Prepared. Pea. Steam. 
1920. 1914. 1920. 19141 1920. 1914. 

Baltimore 2.60 2.00 2.10 1.60 2.10 1.60 

Boston 3.20 2.65 ■ 3.10 2.55 2.90 2.35 

Bridgeport 2.90 2.30 2.80 2.20 2.60 2.00 

Providence 3.30 2.70 3.20 2.60 3.00 2.40 

Washington 2.60 2.00 2.40 1.85 2.10 1.60 

In 1918 the shipments of the various sizes of anthracite, according to th^ U. S. 
Geological Survey, were: Prepared, 60%; Pea, 8.4%; Steam, 31.6%. 

The rates of New York, Philadelphia and tidewater points vary considerably via 
the different roads. The lowest, the medium and the highest rates are as follows: 

Prepared. Pea. Buckwheat No. 1. Smaller sizes. 

New York,. 1920. 1914. 1920. 1914. 1920. 1914. 1920. '1914. 

- Lehigh Valley 2.30 1.80 2.10 1.60 1.90 1.40 1.90 1.40 

Central of N. J 2.60 2.00 2.40 1.85 2.10 1.65 2.00 1.55 

Phila. & Reading 2.90 2.30 2.80 2.20 2.60 2.20 2.60 2.20 

Philadelphia. 

Phila. & Reading 1.90 1.45 1.70 1.25 1.70 1.20 1.70 1.20 

Lehigh Valley 2.00 1.75 1.80 1.45 1.70 1.30 1.70 1.30 

Central of N. J 2.40 1.85 2.10 1.58 2.00 1.49 2.00 1.49 

Tidewater. 

Erie (To Weehawken) .1.90 1.60 1.80 1.45 1.80 1.30 1.80 1.15 

P & R (To Pt. Reading) .1.85 1.55 1.75 1.40 1.75 1.25 1.75 1.10 

P & R (To Pt. Richm'd)1.80 1.30 1.60 1.15 1.50 1.00 1.40 1.00 

P & R (To Pt. Liberty) 2.25 1.60 2.15 1.45 2.15 1.30 2.15 1.15 

To New York the Lehigh Valley rate is for delivery at 38th Street; the Jersey 
Central to 133rd Street, and the Phila. & Reading to 33rd Street. 

To Philadelphia the Phila. & Reading rates are from the Southern and Middle 
fields; the Lehigh Valley from the Lehigh & Schuylkill regions, and the Central of 
New Jersey from the Wyoming Region. The rate on the latter road from the 
Lehigh region is $2.10 on prepared, $1.90 on pea and $1.80 on steam. 

The rates to tidewater points in 1914 on the Phila. & Reading are quoted at a 
higher figure than shown, with reductions to rate named upon evidence that coal 
has been loaded into vessels. 



44 



